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Third World Minister of Trade: "Counselor, your file
appears to be nearly complete. I think we are almost ready
to approve your proposed manufacturing facility."
Multinational Enterprise Lawyer: "I believe the file is
complete. The National Commission on the Transfer of
Technology approved our transfer of technology agree-
ment, but their approval was obtained only after long ne-
gotiations regarding uncertainties in your law. The Cen-
tral Bank approved our application for the exchange of
your currency for dollars, after negotiations on amounts
and the applicable rate of exchange. Your government ap-
proved our OPIC insurance scheme, although we had to
convince them that our desire for insurance did not mean
we view your administration as unstable. We have been to
several ministries and have agreed to provide a health
clinic, a sports facility, and transportation by our com-
pany bus between the plant and the center of town. We
worked out an investment incentive plan to defer taxes for
several years by locating in a high unemployment area.
We further agreed to a level of sixty-five percent domestic
content in our manufacturing, increasing to eighty percent
by annual increments. We agreed to export a fifth of our
production to other nations in your common market area.
The company will be a joint venture, with classes A and B
stock. Class A, constituting fifty-one percent of the equity,
will be available only to your nationals. We will retain the
remaining forty-nine percent class B stock. The board of
directors will be divided between foreign representation of
the parent plant and your nationals in the same percent-
age as the equity. We have agreed to promote a technical
training program in your capital city, and to undertake re-
search and development in your country. It has been a
long process but I believe we have read your laws carefully




Third World Minister of Trade: "Yes, your company is
fortunate to be able to enter our excellent developing mar-
ket. But there is one last item. You need a market feasibil-
ity study completed for my final approval. Here is a busi-
ness card. My brother-in-law is a consultant. He will be
happy to do this study for you."
I. INTRODUCTION
The Operational Code at work. That nebulous array of unwrit-
ten regulations adds a dimension of uncertainty to the maze of
written laws often sufficient in magnitude to cause multinational
enterprise negotiators to terminate discussions with a sense of fu-
tility. A proposed investment is not worthwhile, negotiators be-
lieve, without reliable predictions of future behavior, but there
may be a demonstrably greater amount of predictability than ini-
tially appears in dealing with third world governments.
If multinationals do not have some assurance of how their in-
vestments will function and be treated, the level of foreign direct
investment will diminish. Uncertain sounds from host nation gov-
ernments do not prepare a multinational to invest any more than
uncertain sounds from a trumpet prepare an army for battle. It is
neither political nor economic philosophy which reduces multina-
tionals' interest in investing, but rather uncertainty about the sta-
bility of the particular political and economic system.
To the consternation of market economy third world nations,
multinationals often function effectively in socialist nations where
there is a "negative surprise ratio"-a sureness that once the rules
of the game are established they will not change abruptly. Those
same enterprises may refuse to enter a particular market economy
third world nation where the only consistency achieved is inconsis-
tency due to abrupt changes in the rules under which the multina-
tionals must function.' There is usually a degree of structure and
1. Government officials in market economy developing nations often express dismay at
the reluctance of foreign multinationals to invest in their market economies, and their ea-
gerness to initiate investments in socialist nations. Developing nations' officials fail to un-
derstand that although a multinational enterprise is adaptable to contrasting economic and
political systems, it has a limit of tolerance for severe fluctuations in policy within a nation
after it has made its investment. Multinational officials sometimes speak positively of the
"negative surprise ratio," a consistent and predictable approach to foreign investment in
Eastern European nations. Because of the unique restrictions confronting multinationals
negotiating for direct foreign investment in socialist nations, it may take longer to receive
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sense, however, to the labyrinth of regulations confronting the
multinational enterprise. If the labyrinth is comprehensible, corpo-
rations will be willing to invest in these nations, or at least their
decision not to enter the foreign market will be based on a thor-
ough understanding of the obstacles to a profitable venture. This
article will outline a framework of corporate regulation by third
world nations and illustrate how that framework is not static but
frequently is affected by a variety of forces which change the form
and substance of regulation.
II. THE GOVERNANCE OF MULTINATIONALS-THE EDGE OF
DISCOURAGEMENT
No nation entirely prohibits foreign trade.2 A few prohibit for-
eign direct investments but none are developed market economies.3
While some nations require registration, few require review and
approval of new foreign direct investment. The establishment of a
national foreign investment review organization in a developed
economy, such as the Foreign Investment Review Agency in Ca-
nada, usually generates strong criticism from foreign investors.'
approval of the investment than in many developing nations. Once an agreement is con-
cluded with a socialist government, however, there may be a considerably more predictable
approach toward the investment than has been the case in many developing market
economies.
2. Some nations reserve foreign trade to the state. Foreign trade limited to state orga-
nizations is an attribute of socialist nations. Market economies which have moved toward
socialist ownership of the means of production and distribution normally have not national-
ized commercial trading activities, although the activities may be regulated extensively.
State or foreign trading organizations possess numerous conceptual and practical variances
from more traditional trading relationships. See, e.g., J. QUIGLEY, THE SOVIET FOREIGN
TRADE MONOPOLY: INSTITUTIONS AND LAWS (1974); Quigley, Soviet Foreign Trade Agencies
Abroad: A Note, 37 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 465 (1972). State trading organizations create
some unusual problems in dealing with the West, including their status under the GATT,
and how they are affected by the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.
28 U.S.C. ]1§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976).
3. Foreign direct investment and foreign commerce should be distinguished. Foreign
direct investment usually involves and increases foreign commerce. Foreign commerce alone
is often the first step by which an enterprise begins to penetrate foreign markets. The com-
merce may increase to where it is appropriate to begin production abroad, or the host nation
may begin to require local production to reduce imports. The term "home nation" will be
used to identify those nations, usually in the industrialized world, from which the trade is
initiated or within which the parent or controlling corporation which has a subsidiary
abroad is located. The term "host nation" is used to identify the nation in which the subsid-
iary or affiliate enterprise is located.
4. Foreign Investment Review Act, 21-22 Eliz. II c. 46 (1973). See R. SCHULTZ, F.
SWEDLOVE & K. SWINTON, THE CABINET AS A REGULATORY BODY: THE CASE OF THE FOREIGN
INVESTMENT REVIEW ACT (Econ. Council of Canada 1980); J. LANGFORD, CANADIAN FOREIGN
[Vol. 16:2
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Such a review, premised on whether the investment will be benefi-
cial to the economic development of the host nation, is an appeal-
ing device for opposition political parties. The review agency may
be a nebulous, veiled organ, enshrouding the political or economic
persuasions of its administrators in the mists of the operational
code. It is an ideal institution for the government to quietly pro-
mulgate practices which may be in marked contrast to conceptions
generated by the firm language of the review legislation.
The prohibition of foreign direct investment tends to follow
socialist nation development ideology. It has proven, however, to
be only a temporary prohibition in most nations in the socialist
sphere.' Cuba is one developing, socialist nation which prohibited
INVESTMENT CONTROLS (2d ed. 1979); Spence, The Foreign Investment Review Act of Ca-
nada, SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. (1977); Franck & Gudgeon, Canada's Foreign Invest-
ment Control Experiment: The Law, the Context, and the Practice, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76
(1975); Gualtieri, Canada's Foreign Investment Policy, 10 TEX. INT'L L.J. 46 (1975); McMil-
lan, After the Gray Report: The Tortuous Evolution of Foreign Investment Policy, 20 Mc-
GILL L.J. 213 (1974). Comment, Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Attorney General of Canada: The
Canadian Foreign Investment Review Act, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 505 (1982).
Creation of the Canadian FIRA was central to the Canadian legislative response to
growing nationalism and concern over the impact on Canada of decisions made abroad by
directors of home nation parents of Canadian subsidiaries. Many United States investors
view both the FIRA and Canadian policy as excessively restrictive of business activities and
contrary to Canadian development interests. Two such restrictive actions were mandating
an extensive use of French in business transactions and the national energy policy proposing
Canadianization of oil production. See ENERGY, MINES AND RESOURCES, CANADA, THE NA-
TIONAL ENERGY PROGRAM (1980) (a Canadian government publication in pamphlet form).
5. The USSR continues to prohibit any foreign direct investment. See Pedersen, Joint
Ventures in the Soviet Union: A Legal and Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 390
(1975) (suggesting that a joint venture by contract might be possible in the USSR, although
there is no Soviet legislative sanction of the joint venture form used in the other socialist
nations). See also Osakwe, Legal and Institutional Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade:
Soviet Perspective, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 85 (1974). The consequence is felt in Eastern
Europe, where foreign direct investment has assumed the limited form of joint ventures and
has proceeded slowly. Joint ventures have nonetheless become important in Eastern Europe
and legislation exists governing them in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugosla-
via. See N. BALOG & T. VARADY, JOINT VENTURES & LONG-TERM ECONOMIC COOPERATION
WITH FOREIGN FIRMS (1979); E. LAMERS, JOINT VENTURES BETWEEN YUGOSLAV AND FOREIGN
ENTERPRISES (1976); C. MCMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES, JOINT VENTURES IN EAST EUROPE: A
THREE-COUNTRY COMPARISON (1974); M. SUKIJASOVIC, JOINT BUSINESS VENTURES IN YUGOSLA-
VIA BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN FIRMS: DEVELOPMENTS IN LAW AND PRACTICE (1973);
JOINT BUSINESS VENTURES OF YUGOSLAV ENTERPRISES AND FOREIGN FIRMS (W. Friedman & L.
Mates eds. 1968); Burzynski & Juergensmeyer, Poland's New Foreign Investment Regula-
tions: An Added Dimension to East-West Industrial Cooperation, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 17 (1981); Gordon, The Developing Law of Joint Ventures in Eastern Europe, 9 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 281 (1974). The recent Chinese and Cuban laws permitting joint ventures illus-
trate an increased willingness to experiment with foreign direct investment in socialist na-
tions some distance from the USSR, whether under the influence of the USSR (Cuba) or
distant from recognizing Soviet preeminence in the socialist community (China). Joint yen-
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foreign direct investment for nearly a quarter of a century.' The
absence of foreign direct investment in Cuba, however, is neither a
function of Cuba's developing status nor its socialist political-eco-
nomic philosophy. It is related more to the fact that this long pe-
riod of conceptualistic sterility is a characteristic of socialist revo-
lutions. Cuban leaders now accept, as have leaders of other nations
following this predictable process, that the achievement of devel-
opmental goals necessitates, or at least is accomplished more rap-
idly by, reintroducing some foreign direct investment.
Where socialist nations have opened the door to foreign direct
investment it has been on an extremely limited basis, centering on
a unique socialist form of joint venture. That form retains, at least
in theory, the majority ownership interest and control in the host
nation's state government or its state commercial enterprise.7 The
entry of Cuba into the club of socialist nations encouraging joint
venture foreign direct investment was predictable. The Cuban law
follows the basic framework of joint venture legislation in socialist
nations in Eastern Europe, and, to a more limited degree, the form
adopted in China.'
ture theory is working its way into socialist economic law. Until recently, the absence of
foreign direct investment in socialist nations has proven to be a temporary phenomenon
caused by economic alterations fundamental to a socialist revolution. It is a combination of
the absence of interest of foreign investors after a massive nationalization (usually without
adequate compensation) and the ideological purity which disallows absentee or total private
ownership of the means of production and distribution. But the ideological purity tends to
tarnish in time; foreign investors return after old wounds have healed, or new investors
replace the old. Ideological purity may be maintained if joint ventures are admitted only as
transitory institutions. Even capitalist institutions should be admitted temporarily if they
speed the socialist nations to their destiny of communism.
6. Economic Associations Between Cuban and Foreign Entities, Legislative Decree No.
50 (Feb. 15, 1982), translated in Possibility of Joint Ventures in Cuba, CAMARA DE COMER-
CIo DE LA REPOBLICA DE CUBA 8, 8-12 (Feb. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Cuban Joint Venture
Decree].
7. The Yugoslav model is sui generis. Ownership of the means of production and dis-
tribution is not vested in the state, but rather in the workers employed in a particular plant
at a given time. The concept of workers' social property involves much mythology. The state
is an invisible hand which governs, directly and indirectly, much of the activity of an enter-
prise. The system, nevertheless, is quite different from the structures in other Eastern Euro-
pean nations.
8. Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and For-
eign Investment (July 8, 1979), translated in Reynolds, The Joint Venture Law of the Peo-
ple's Republic; Preliminary Observations, 14 INT'L LAW. 45 (1980) (unofficial translation).
See generally Klingenberg & Pattison, Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China:
The New Legal Environment, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 807 (1979); Theroux, Technology Sales to
China: New Laws and Old Problems, 14 J. Int'l L. & Econ. 185 (1980); Note, Joint Ven-
tures in the People's Republic of China, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 133 (1979). Initial reaction
to the Chinese law was directed to its brevity, and the absence of attention to a number of
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The existence of foreign direct investment in all but a very
limited number of nations of the world affirms that the socialist
practice constitutes an aberration. The presence of foreign direct
investment is the norm. But its presence should not suggest that it
is viewed with consistent enthusiasm by host nation governments,
the domestic private investment sector, labor organizations in the
host nations, and critics of the press and academia. Some observers
consider it as, at best, an unwelcomed guest, acknowledged as a
necessary component of the developmental process such as tech-
nology, employment, import substitution, export promotion and
access to hard currencies." These benefits are a trade-off; accept-
ance of foreign direct investment is often thought to be threaten-
ing, to cause dislocations or even a permanent, negative paralysis
to political and economic structures and to social and cultural in-
stitutions and traditions of the nation.
Hostility to or suspicion of multinationals is present to some
degree in most host nations, whether they are developing or social-
ist nations. This is true even of some developed host nations. For-
eign investors must be aware of the potential consequences of such
hostility, and how it is reflected in the written and unwritten
framework of foreign direct investment laws.
The nations of the world which permit foreign investment may
be divided into two groups: nations which openly accept foreign
direct investment and nations which restrictively accept foreign di-
rect investment. Those nations that openly accept foreign direct
investment are primarily the larger developed nations with a large
elements of control and participation in the profits of the enterprise. Both areas were sub-
ject to considerably greater attention in the Eastern European joint venture laws. Further
legislation helped to clarify some of the problems. The marked contrast in the Chinese law,
especially its brevity, discloses that China had little recent experience in initiating legisla-
tion governing commercial relations with the West. Additionally, and more important for a
conceptual understanding of trading with China, the legal system's role in China differs
from its role in the West. In China, there is a much greater concentration upon negotiation
to initiate trading relationships and upon conciliation in resolving disputes.
9. The Cuban Chamber of Commerce material promoting the Cuban joint venture law
states that the law is intended "for the basic purpose of expanding its exports and interna-
tional tourism." Cuban Joint Venture Decree, supra note 6, at 2. Not all socialist nation
joint venture laws identify the goals which the nation seeks to achieve by adopting joint
venture legislation. But the Cuban law states, "the country's economic development requires
this type of association in those activities that call for more financial resources, raw materi-
als, technologies and markets than we have available in order to employ our material and
human resources." Id., Preamble. It implies more of a balanced partnership contribution




base of locally owned direct investment. In these countries the ad-
dition of foreign direct investment is not viewed as a threat to do-
mestic institutions.
Some smaller developing nations appear to openly accept for-
eign direct investment by way of incentive-based legislation. These
laws afford easy entry and minimum operational restrictions and
comparatively free repatriation of profits. While this is characteris-
tic of nations which openly accept foreign direct investment, other
characteristics of these smaller developing nations suggest they are
actually applying a more restrictive basis. For example, these coun-
tries are suspicious of the possible negative impact of the foreign
investment upon the nation's cultural, economic and political insti-
tutions. This concern may be expressed in nominally restrictive op-
erational codes even though the written laws of the nation at the
same time evidence a more open acceptance of foreign direct
investment.
Nations which restrictively accept foreign direct investment
will concentrate their restrictions on one or more of the three
above noted areas: the ease of entrance, restrictions on operations,
and the regulation of the repatriation of profits. A multinational
thus may discover it is easy to enter a nation, but may subse-
quently confront severe operational restrictions or complex regula-
tions on the repatriation of profits. Other times, the nation may be
difficult to enter, but once entered may be less restrictive in regu-
lating a company's operations or profit repatriation. When the law
invites investment but the restrictions are severe in all areas of in-
vestment, the nation approaches a de facto prohibition of foreign
direct investment.
Nations currently allowing foreign investment often strive to
create regulations which narrowly fall short of the degree of re-
strictiveness which would cause a large scale withdrawal of foreign
direct investment. Those multinational enterprises which possess
needed investment obviously do not assist host nations in achiev-
ing that goal. Multinationals react adversely to any form of regula-
tion and often attempt to convince host nation authorities that the
nation either has achieved the nadir of restrictiveness, or, more
likely, that the nation is retarding development. They argue, that
the restrictiveness has increased above the Edge of Discourage-
ment. Each nation has such a level which the combination of its
written and unwritten laws must not exceed.
[Vol. 16:2
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The Edge of Discouragement slopes upwards in the degree of
acceptable restrictiveness over time. Foreign investors learn to
function in an atmosphere of increasing restrictiveness, as long as
the point of investment impossibility is not reached. It is difficult
for host nations to determine the optimum level for the regulation
without discouraging foreign direct investment. No two developing
or socialist nations possess such similar domestic, political, eco-
nomic, and social characteristics that a uniform code of regulation
of direct foreign investment could be produced. The framework of
any one nation for the governance of foreign direct investment
consequently may consist of a sophisticated and finely tuned set of
norms, or it may include elements of regulatory absurdity, based
on misconceptions either of the impact of the foreign investment,
or the ability of the host nation to regulate without causing the
withdrawal of needed foreign investment.
Where a regulatory framework grows out of concern that large
scale foreign direct investment inevitably will cause an adverse im-
pact on the host nation, the resulting regulatory process will prob-
ably be poorly constructed. The larger developing nations, often
referred to as advanced developing countries (ADCs), or newly in-
dustrializing countries (NICs), including, for example, Brazil, India
and Mexico, need not be fearful of a large degree of foreign influ-
1984]
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ence such as may easily occur in many of the smaller developing
nations. The latter often must deal with the presence of the single,
large, dominant multinationals."
Multinationals with unique technology occasionally create spe-
cial conflicts within the advanced developing countries. These are
isolated circumstances, however, that do not generate threatening
situations for those nations with regard to the aggregate of foreign
direct investment. 1 These advanced developing countries, how-
ever, may become concerned if a large percentage of their gross
national product is generated by foreign direct investment, espe-
cially if the investment is largely by multinationals from a single
home nation."2 That concern is probably directed more to the na-
10. An OAS study comparing gross national products of OAS member nations with net
sales of major multinational enterprises shows that only Brazil, Mexico and Argentina have
larger GNPs than the net sales of General Motors, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Ford Mo-
tors, and the Royal Dutch Shell Group. Venezuela, Chile, Colombia, and Peru were inter-
spaced with GE, IBM, Mobil Oil, Chrysler, Unilever, IT&T and Texaco, but 48 additional
companies preceded the next nation, Uruguay. 1 ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, PAPERS
OF THE CAPITAL MARKETS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 86 (June 1974) [hereinafter cited as OAS
PAPERS].
11. Two recent experiences in India illustrate these special conflicts. India enacted a
law mandating joint ventures, and attempted to apply it to both the Coca Cola and IBM
subsidiaries in India. Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1973. IBM has no joint ventures
anywhere in the world, a policy it has pursued successfully only because of the leverage it
possesses by owning advanced technology. The company policy is discussed in 1 M. GORDON,
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS LAW-MEXICO, CENTRAL AMERICA, PANAMA AND THE CENTRAL
AMERICAN COMMON MARKET B.24 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1 GORDON, MULTINATIONALS].
In India, IBM refused to alter its structure and admit Indian equity participation. That
response was expected. The experience of Coca Cola was quite different because it did not
reject the concept of the joint venture. Many of its foreign bottlers are wholly locally owned,
a characteristic typical of franchise operations. The Indian government demanded, however,
that the local enterprise would have to fully produce the drink within India. Although offi-
cials insist that they never directly asked Coca Cola to disclose the syrup formula which is
the basis of the cola drink, they agree that disclosure would have been a necessary conse-
quence of meeting the requirements of the law. Predictably, as with IBM, Coca Cola refused
and withdrew. The production of soft drinks was left in the hands of many inefficient do-
mestic producers and the public was left without a popular drink. In each case, the govern-
ment could have been more direct and simply ordered the company out of India. The ad-
vantage of the chosen method was that it allowed India to state that the companies were
never asked to leave. Without additional knowledge, the requested changes appeared per-
fectly reasonable. Further, similar requests were being agreed to by many other
multinationals.
12. The pre-1959 relationship of Cuba and the United States illustrates such a connec-
tion. The United States was the overwhelmingly dominant source of trade and foreign direct
investment in Cuba. Cuba, consequently, was able to expropriate all foreign owned property,
refuse payment to United States investors, settle with other nations and avoid any immedi-
ately successful economic retaliation. See M. GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE
DEMISE OF FOREIGN PRIVATE PROPERTY (1976); Gordon, The Cuban Claims Act: Progress in
the Development of a Viable Valuation Process in the FCSC, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 625
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ture of the relationship with individual multinationals than to the
perceived negative effects of extensive foreign direct investment on
the nation's social, economic, and political relationships and
institutions.'"
Smaller developing nations, by virtue of their dependency sta-
tus, must be more concerned with foreign direct investment than
the more advanced developing countries. 4 The concern is greater
here because it is more difficult for these smaller nations to gener-
ate sufficient development without foreign direct investment, and
because the institutions which regulate foreign direct investment
are far more fragile than those in the advanced developing coun-
tries.' 5 Consequently, it should be apparent that different levels of
need for foreign direct investment exist as do different levels of
hostility towards its presence, and different levels of capacity to
govern discouragement. Further, vastly different levels of institu-
tional capacity and efficiency exist among various nations to effec-
tuate any chosen form of governing framework.
Multinationals clearly have an impact on institutional struc-
tures of host developing nations. This fact, however, does not jus-
tify accusing multinationals of unlawful or amoral conduct or of
any wrong greater than bearing the burden of visibility. The size of
these corporations makes them a natural target of blame for the
(1973); Gordon, The Settlement of Claims for Expropriated Foreign Private Property Be-
tween Cuba and Foreign Nations Other than the United States, 5 LAW. AM. 457 (1973).
13. The effects may result from extensive political lobbying, the payment of bribes,
the diminishing of a nation's indigenous culture, the contribution to an economically un-
sound balance of payments and other sources. The developing and socialist nations, possess-
ing currencies which are frequently unstable and often unacceptable to the larger trading
nations, must be concerned with the impact of foreign direct investment on currency flows.
The regulatory framework of the most advanced developing countries, illustrated by the
Brazilian currency regulations, discloses a major concentration on currency exchange and
profit repatriation. For a discussion of profit remittance law, see Rosenn, Regulation of For-
eign Investment in Brazil: A Critical Analysis, 15 LAW. AM. 307 (1983).
14. The author refers to the smaller developing nations which do not have vast, known
and producing natural resources from which they achieve status as advanced developing
countries, or which have not developed their human resources to gain such status, as depen-
dent rather than developing nations. See Gordon, Developed, Developing and Dependent
Nations: Central American Development in a New Economic Realignment, 2 J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 1 (1976).
15. One may not think that the Quaker Oats Company is a significant, large, multina-
tional enterprise, but its net sales exceed the annual gross national product of Paraguay.
When small, dependent nations admit not only enterprises the size of Quaker Oats, but
numerous other multinationals whose net assets dwarf the host nation's GNP, the countries
concern over the possible negative impact of the corporations is understandable. See OAS
PAPERS, supra note 10, at 86, 92.
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infinite ills of the often troubled economies of developing nations.
Multinational enterprises should, nonetheless, convince govern-
ments in developing nations that the enterprises cannot function if
subjected to endless regulation or abrupt fluctuations in the regu-
latory pattern.
Host nations must not view multinational enterprises as a bot-
tomless pit of resources transferable to the less affluent sectors of
the world through cleverly changing the rules of the game. Mul-
tinationals should not be criticized when they ask for predictability
and assurance that laws in the host country will not inordinately
change. Investors are aware that the rules will change, but they are
justifiably hesitant to invest when the rules fluctuate between poli-
cies of nationalization and denationalization, 6 and when rules re-
quire major alterations to formerly acceptable structures. 7
16. The Argentine reaction to foreign investment illustrates this "flip-flop" approach.
The 1971 law encouraged foreign investment. Ley No. 19.151 of Aug. 5, 1971, [1972] C.
Anales 1847, translated in 10 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1194 (1971). But the 1973 foreign invest-
ment law enacted under the Per6n government, adopted a restrictive attitude. Ley No.
20.557 of Nov. 7, 1973 [1973] C. Anales, translated in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1489 (1973). A
military coup in 1976 resulted in the enactment of a far less restrictive law designed to
reestablish a favorable climate for foreign investment. Ley No. 21.382 of Aug. 13, 1976
[1976] C. Anales, translated in 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1364 (1976). The 1976 law was a return
to the encouraging attitude toward foreign investment of the 1971 act, which Per6n had
significantly altered in the 1973 act. But the 1976 law was not as open toward foreign invest-
ment as had been the 1971 law. When a country moves from a policy of openly accepting
foreign investment to a restrictive policy, a subsequent return to an open policy tends not to
be as open a policy as previously existed. There is, consequently, a slow but continuous
upward slope to the restrictiveness of regulation of foreign investment in the Public Code,
as illustrated in the graphs and discussions in the text of this article. The Argentine legisla-
tion, and two decisions affected by both the legislation and some judicial law making, are
contained in Gordon, Argentine Jurisprudence: Deltec Update, 11 LAW. AM. 43 (1979);
Gordon, Argentine Jurisprudence: The Parke Davis and Deltec Cases, 6 LAW. AM. 320
(1974); Marzorati, National Report on Argentina, Applicable Law to Determine the Person,
Individual and Corporate, Who Controls a Marketable Share Company whose Subsidiary
Functions Abroad, 11TH INT'L CONG. OF CoMP. LAW (Caracas 1982). See also Giacchino, For-
eign Investment Under Contemporary Argentine Law, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 91 (1978).
17. The cases of Coca Cola and IBM, supra note 11, outline the retroactive application
of joint venture nationalizing legislation. The Andean Common Market Decision 24 also
required structural alterations to receive benefits from the Market. See Decision 24 of the
Commission of the Cartagena Agreement: Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital
and of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses, and Royalties, Dec. 31, 1970, translated in 11 INT'L
LEGAL MAT. 126 (1972), as amended, translated in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 138 (1977). See also
Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: A New Phase in the Quest for Normative
Order as to Direct Foreign Investment, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 763 (1972). The Mexican legisla-
tion, while not specifically retroactive, has been viewed as having the same result. See Creel,
"Mexicanization": A Case of Creeping Expropriation, 22 Sw. L.J. 281 (1968). Mexico has
adopted tax measures which make it more beneficial to own a minority interest than a ma-
jority interest in some enterprises. The general foreign investment law mandates Mexi-
GOVERNANCE OF MULTINATIONALS
Often when representatives of multinationals criticize changes
in the rules of the game, a pattern of predictability actually exists
of which the multinationals are unaware and with which they are
unprepared to deal. To consider only the written investment laws
of the host nations is to overlook two important elements of the
regulatory framework of foreign direct investment. One element in-
cludes those declarations of multi-nation organizations which have
neither gained status as international law, nor found their way into
the host nation's domestic law. The second includes those unwrit-
ten operational practices which constitute "the way things work."
III. GOVERNANCE BY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Besides the framework of the host nation's regulatory process,
multinationals are also governed by the laws of their own (home)
nations, as well as by international law. Neither of these laws has
proven of much comfort to host nations, whether they are develop-
ing, socialist, or developed. Even though home nation laws may
have extraterritorial reach, they are enacted to achieve home na-
tion goals and not to achieve interests of foreign host nations. Al-
though ancillary benefits may accrue to the host nations, the legis-
lative bodies of home nations should not be expected to pass laws
contrary to the interests of their own corporate enterprises func-
tioning abroad.
Expectations should not be unduly placed on international
law. Purported international legal norms include many concepts
formulated decades ago by processes stimulated and controlled by
developed nations. Developing and socialist nations now reject
these concepts whenever they are thought to ignore or discriminate
against the economic development of these nations. It is appropri-
ate, however, to comment on the governance of multinationals by
home nations and by multinational authorities. This article will
note the inadequacies of this form of regulation. It will also em-
phasize that the most effective control of foreign direct investment
is through a host nation's regulatory framework, which can be both
effective and compatible with the achievement of fair relations in
international trade.
canization of an enterprise which wishes to develop new lines of products or establish new
manufacturing locations. See Gomez-Palacio, Defining "New Lines of Products" Under
Mexico's Foreign Investment Law, 8 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 74 (1978).
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IV. GOVERNANCE BY THE HOME NATION-UNITED STATES LAW
The regulation of United States' multinationals abroad en-
compasses an extensive scheme of control. While both state and
federal laws govern corporations within the United States, federal
law has the most significant extraterritorial consequences., These
federal laws are generally of two classes. First are those laws en-
acted without serious consideration of their impact in the foreign
sphere. They are concerned mainly with domestic issues, but their
effect extends to foreign activities. These laws, exemplified by
United States antitrust legislation, may have unintended and nega-
tive consequences abroad.
The second group are laws which are enacted to resolve spe-
cific international conflicts. In so doing, they also generate extra-
territorial control over foreign activities of United States' multina-
tionals.1" This second group of laws is less likely to have an
unintended, negative impact abroad. When the conflict generating
a legislative response, however, involves more than one foreign na-
tion and national preference choices must be made, certain foreign
nations may be harmed to the benefit of others. An illustration is
the United States anti-boycott law, in which political choices were
made between relationships with Israel and Arab nations.20
What might be a third, but largely non-existent, group are
laws which would govern activities of multinationals abroad,
neither exclusively passed for the benefit of home nation trade, nor
to resolve specific international trading conflicts solely from the
home nation perspective. They are laws enacted with the primary
motivation of assisting in third world development. This third
group is mostly an empty class, much to the disappointment of the
18. This article does not discuss whether United States laws, applied to American
multinationals abroad, deal fairly with the socialist and developed worlds. If such fairness is
achieved, it may be because the laws must be equitable to be of a long term usefulness to
the United States. The concept of fairness in trading is a scarcely studied subject. For a
discussion of fairness relating to commercial transactions with Latin America, see
Kozolchyk, Fairness in Anglo and Latin American Commercial Adjudication, 2 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 219 (1979).
19. An example is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd(1)-(2),
78ff (1982).
20. The anti-boycott law is composed principally of section 999 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code (1954), Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. 2401 (Supp. IV 1980), and
guidelines issued by Treasury and Commerce Departments. See Treasury Guidelines for the




developing world. The sparcity of such laws should convince host
nation governments that developed nations are not likely to be the
source of any substantial regulatory pattern favorable to the host
nations.
A. Laws Resolving Domestic Problems
1. Antitrust Laws
The United States antitrust laws were a response to restraints
of trade within the United States. The extension to foreign com-
merce was not to resolve an existing international trade conflict.
The growth of international trade since 1890 has given an impor-
tance to the brief Sherman Act words regarding foreign commerce
that may never have been intended, and which would be better
addressed by more specific legislation designed to resolve contem-
porary foreign antitrust conflicts.2 '
The current law, however, is found principally in cases, not in
the Sherman Act. The principle of these cases is that the activities
of enterprises abroad violate the Sherman Act when those activi-
ties have an adverse effect upon commerce within the United
States - a view which generates much hostile foreign reaction.
That reaction, whether in the form of blocking laws or clawback
provisions, 22 reveals that the United States antitrust laws are con-
21. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See generally Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Antitrust Guide for International Operations (1977), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS 173 (J. Griffin ed.
1979); K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (1958); Kintner & Griffin,
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. IND. &
CoM. L. REV. 199 (1977); Ongman, "Be No Longer a Chaos": Constructing a Normative
Theory of the Sherman Act's Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Scope, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 733
(1977); Paugh, Antitrust Principles and U.S. Trade Laws: A Review of Current Areas of
Conflict, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 545 (1980); Paugh, The Application of U.S. Economic
Regulations to International Commerce: A Comparison of the Sherman Act and U.S. In-
ternational Trade Regulations Laws, 13 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 961 (1981).
22. See, e.g., The United Kingdom Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980. Where
orders have extraterritorial effect, the Act extends the power of the government to forbid
compliance with orders of authorities in foreign states which ask British citizens to disclose
information harmful to British trading interests; it also prohibits courts in the United King-
dom from enforcing foreign judgments, which include multiple damage awards and some
other restrictive practices judgments, and allows British citizens who are confronted with
multiple judgment awards against them to recover the noncompensatory portion from the
plaintiffs (clawback concept) in an action brought in a United Kingdom court. See Lowe,
Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act,
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sidered by foreign nations to be both an infringement on national
sovereignty and adverse to host nation trade development. These
retaliatory responses have a profound effect and bring to the legal
institutions of trade relationships a political and economic tension
which hinders world trade. They also establish a negative norm of
conflict which will affect trading relationships well beyond the an-
titrust issue.
2. Securities Regulation
A second United States law, enacted without serious consider-
ation to foreign impact or foreign nation reaction, regulates securi-
ties trading.25 The extraterritorial reach of these laws has not gen-
erated the same hostility as the antitrust laws. Challenged
activities have not tended to involve issues of the magnitude of
antitrust conflicts such as, the uranium cartel disputes.24 There is
no evidence, however, that United States courts or the President
will be any more sensitive to the foreign reaction to securities laws
than they have been with the antitrust laws. The antitrust and se-
curities laws, enacted in pursuit of domestic goals, serve to illus-
trate a conflict-creating situation. They also reinforce the theory
that nations hosting foreign direct investment should not rely on
this form of home nation laws to assist in regulating multinational
enterprises.
1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981). Other nations, including France, Australia and New
Zealand, have enacted similar protective national trade laws.
23. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982). The Act states
that:
The provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not
apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the
jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such business in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter.
Id. § 78dd.
24. See Goldman & Magrino, Some Foreign Aspects of Securities Regulation: To-
wards a Reevaluation of Section 30(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 55 VA. L.
REv. 1015 (1969); Comment, From Schoenbaum to Scherk: The Continuing Question of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction in an International Securities Transaction, 12 Hous. L. REV.
924 (1975). Recently, the extraterritorial effect was emphasized by the use of secret Swiss
accounts to mask the identity of inside traders in the securities of United States corpora-
tions. The United States extracted an agreement from the Swiss to establish new banking
rules allowing disclosure of the identity of persons using Swiss accounts for such purpose.
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B. Laws Resolving International Conflicts
The second form of home nation laws, those with an extrater-
ritorial affect which are passed to resolve current international
trade conflicts, are illustrated by the anti-boycott laws and the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 5
1. Boycott Legislation
United States boycott legislation has political roots. The
United States economic boycott of Cuba,26 the withdrawal from
the United Nations sanctioned boycott of Rhodesia,2" and the anti-
boycott laws directed to the Arab nations' actions against Israel,28
show how laws governing the activities of multinationals abroad
subordinate long-term interests of international trade to short-
term political goals. These laws, however, are positively viewed by
some host nations. Israel, for example, welcomed the boycott that
was directed against the Arab nations. The United States' with-
drawal from the Rhodesian sanctions similarly was viewed favora-
bly by the Soviet Union. Although they directly addressed an in-
ternational trade issue, they were not motivated to achieve a just
pattern of international commerce, but were intended to achieve
political aspirations of the United States.
2. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act also was enacted in an ef-
fort to resolve an international conflict brought to public scrutiny
25. See supra notes 19-20.
26. See Shneyer & Barta, Legality of the U.S. Economic Blockade of Cuba Under
International Law, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 451 (1981). See generally Note, Legal Im-
pediments to Nationalization of Trade with Cuba, 8 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1007 (1976).
27. For a discussion of the Rhodesian case see chapter 4 of A. LOWENFELD, TRADE
COrROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS 259 (1977). See also McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the
United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1968);
Recent Decisions, International Sanctions - United Nations Security Council Resolution -
Economic Sanctions Against Southern Rhodesia, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 319 (1974); S.C. Res.
333, U.N. Doc. S/Res./333 adopted May 22, 1973; Note, The Rhodesian Chrome Statute:
The Congressional Response to United Nations Economic Sanctions Against Southern
Rhodesia, 58 VA. L. REV. 511 (1972).
28. See The Arab Boycott of Israel, in A. LOWENFELD, supra note 27, at 95; Greene,
The Arab Economic Boycott of Israel: The International Law Perspective, 11 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 77 (1978); Lowenfeld, ". . Sauce for the Gander"" The Arab Boycott and
United States Political Trade Controls, 12 TEx. INT'L L.J. 25 (1977).
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in 1976. Numerous disclosures by the Securities and Exchange
Commission documented payments made by United States mul-
tinationals to persons holding high political offices in many devel-
oping nations. They included Japan, the Netherlands and Italy, as
well as Honduras and many other small developing nations.2
The United States' legislative reaction was primarily politi-
cally motivated, because several of the payments created distres-
sing political imbalances in the industrialized nations with which
the United States had long maintained most favorable relations,
and destabilized some political parties the United States wished to
preserve. Beyond the political motivations, the law also has an eth-
ical foundation because bribes are not valued in our system as a
way of doing business. They are discomforting to our notions of
fair trading and viewed as a chronic development-retarding ele-
ment in the third world. Thus, denying payments may diminish
government corruption which severely retards development, by es-
tablishing a moral element in trade relationships which may not be
shared abroad.
Other laws regulate foreign activities of multinational enter-
prises and encourage multinationals to invest in developing nations
by providing advantages such as tax benefits. United States' laws
and those of other developed nations which assist development,
however, generally are not in the form of the regulation of multina-
tional enterprise activities. For example, the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP), o and customs provisions allow for the estab-
29. See generally Lashbrooke, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. A Unilat-
eral Solution to an International Problem, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 227 (1979); Herlihy &
Levine, Corporate Crisis: The Overseas Payment Problem, 8 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 547
(1976).
30. The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) offers non-reciprocal tariff reductions
to certain manufactured and non-manufactured products imported from developing nations.
It is a complex system, participated in by numerous developed nations with the guarded
blessing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It includes several restric-
tions that, according to third world viewers, severely limit its usefulness. T. MURRAY, TRADE
PREFERENCES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1977); Ginman & Murray, The Generalized Sys-
tem of Preferences: A Review and Appraisal, in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER:
CONFRONTATION OR COOPERATION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH? at 190-209 (K. Sauvant & H.
Hasenpflug eds. 1977); Graham, The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences for Develop-
ing Countries: International Innovation and the Art of the Possible, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 513
(1978); Nemmers & Rowland, The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences: Too Much Sys-
tem, Too Little Preference, 9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 855 (1977). Note, The Generalized
System of Preferences: Nations More Favored Than Most, 8 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 783
(1976). See also Behnam, Development and Structure of the Generalized System of Prefer-
ences, 9 J. WORLD TRADE L. 442 (1975); McCulloch, United States Preferences: The Pro-
posed System, 8 J. WORLD TRADE L. 216 (1974); Krishnamurti, The Agreement on Prefer-
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lishment of foreign assembly industries to promote third world de-
velopment, but they are relatively minor in magnitude and all di-
rected less to the governance of multinational enterprises than to
isolated issues of trade.8
A more thorough review of United States' laws affecting the
activities of its multinationals in foreign nations would further
show that those laws were designed to achieve domestic, economic,
and political benefits. Only rarely or indirectly do they attempt to
aid in the governance of multinational activities abroad so as to
enhance development. Host nations, whether they are developed,
socialist, or developing, should not rely on the home nations of
multinational enterprises to regulate those entities in a manner
perceived by a host nation to be suitable to the improvement of
the quality of life. This should not suggest, however, that regula-
tions enacted in the home nations of multinational enterprises
should be viewed as counterproductive to development; rather they
are just not motivated to serve foreign aspirations for
development.
V. GOVERNANCE BY MULTI-NATION ORGANIZATIONS-THE
ASPIRATIONAL DECLARATIONS
A second tier of multinational governance consists of regula-
tions by multi-nation organizations, although the adequacy of this
type of regulation is questionable when directed at conduct in de-
veloping host nations. The principal multi-nation organization
which has attempted to regulate multinationals is the United Na-
tions. The United Nations and its subsidiary associations have had
little success, however, in developing an effective, widely accepted
regulatory scheme for the multinational enterprises. This should
not be surprising as it is a large organization with extreme diver-
sity of cultural, economic and political composition. That is as it
ences, A Generalized System in Favour of Developing Countries, 5 J. WORLD TRADE L. 45
(1971).
31. Two provisions of the United States tariff code and several Mexican laws and de-
crees have been the basis for extensive industry development in Mexican towns adjacent to
the United States border. The tariff provisions were not enacted for the purpose of allowing
the industry to develop. Rather, they evolved as part of the United States policy toward
trade relationships with Mexico, and have received strong criticism from United States la-
bor organizations claiming the tariffs encourage the transfer of jobs from the United States
to Mexico. 19 U.S.C. § 1201 (1976). The Mexican laws are translated in 1 M. GORDON, MUL-
TINATIONALS supra note 11, at B.5. See D. BAERRESEN, THE BORDER INDUSTRIALIZATION PRO-
GRAM OF MExicO (1971).
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should be. However ideally conceived the United Nations may be
to govern multinationals objectively, the record to date has not
been impressive.
As in the case of regulation by home nations, the pronounce-
ments of the United Nations and other multi-nation organizations
which have a developing nation member dominance must not be
ignored. Their pronouncements are directed to how things "ought
to be" in the perspective of the developing sector of the world
community. These views represent an important element in the
framework of governance of multinational enterprises by host na-
tions. Emanating from a multi-nation organization, they neverthe-
less illustrate an aggregate response by developing and socialist na-
tions. They may be consistent with written and, more importantly,
unwritten, host nation laws and policies affecting foreign direct in-
vestment. While the policies of host nations often are not ex-
pressed in writing and are overlooked by leading multinational
representatives, they are written and disclosed in the pronounce-
ments of the multi-nation organizations.
Whether several of these United Nations pronouncements af-
fecting multinationals constitute international law is an important
issue that has become largely academic.3 2 Of greater importance is
their disclosure of the aspirations of the large majority of the de-
veloping and socialist members, and a few developed nations."3 Be-
32. 0. DE RIVERO, NEw ECONOMIC ORDER AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW
(1980); Brower & Tepe, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Reflection
or Rejection of International Law? 9 INT'L LAW. 295 (1975); Garcia-Amador, The Proposed
New International Economic Order: A New Approach to the Law Governing Nationaliza-
tion and Compensation, 12 LAW. AM. 1 (1980); Geiser, A New International Economic Or-
der: Its Impact on the Evolution of International Law (pt. IV), 9 ANNALS INT'L STUD. 97
(1978). Virally, La Charte des Droits et Devoirs Economiques des Etats, Notes des Lecture,
XX ANNUAIEE FRAN AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 57 (1974).
33. Whether socialist nations voted favorably for these declarations because they be-
lieved in the principles espoused, or because they wished to side with the developing nations
against the developed is not easy to discern. Many of the principles dealing with property
promulgated by these declarations, however, have long been supported in socialist legal the-
ory. The U.S.S.R. view has been that because states are sovereign in international law, the
laws of the state rather than international law must govern the taking of property from
private persons as well as all aspects of compensation. See generally G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (W. Butler trans. 1974); Vilkow, Nationalization and International
Law, 1960 SOVIET Y.B. INT'L L. 58. Developed nations which have supported these Aspira-
tional Declarations have done so for several reasons. These reasons include a commitment to
the concepts embodied in the declarations, or, in the absence of such commitment, a belief
that the nation could cultivate the goodwill of the socialist and developing nations by join-
ing with them while relying on other developed nations to oppose the Aspirational
Declarations.
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cause they reflect the aspirations of these nations, this author re-
fers to them as Aspirational Declarations.3 4 They are written, but
not law.35
The most important Aspirational Declarations are two General
Assembly resolutions, the Declaration of Establishment of a New
International Economic Order," and the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States.7 They are important because of their
focus upon consequential areas of conflict between multinational
enterprises and host nations, and because they were issued by the
largest and most important multi-nation organization. Other As-
pirational Declarations have come from smaller, third world and
socialist nation-dominated political or economic associations. The
aspirations of many of these nations have been presented by the
Group of 77, those nations within the developing and socialist
sphere which have generated the north-south dialogue. But the
pronouncements of that group are frequently less aspirational than
frustrational, often focusing on demands for a direct transfer of
resources from the rich to the poor without restrictions. 8 They are
important, however, for they include within the transfer demand a
greater flow of technology which largely is the property of multina-
tional enterprises in the developed world. The Group of 77's As-
34. The term is neutral. To regard them as meaningless or vest them with excessive
authority would render them practically useless. Only a neutral designation allows them to
assume characteristics useful to both their supporters and detractors.
35. They are not law in the sense that a large number of important home and host
nations would not view them as sources to which disputants on both sides would turn to
seek a resolution of foreign direct investment conflicts. This does not mean that the regula-
tory framework proposed in this article is therefore subject to challenge, because the frame-
work is designed to illustrate the positive elements of the declarations important to multina-
tional representatives.
36. G.A. Res. 3201, 6th Special Session, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974), reprinted in 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 798 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Declaration of a
NIEO]. The declaration was adopted by consensus without a vote.
37. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Charter on Economic Rights]. The Charter on Economic Rights adds a more
elaborate structure to the Declaration of a NIEO; the two are considered the principle docu-
ments which establish the new international economic order and have given thrust to an
emergence of a law of development. See Schachter, The Evolving International Law of De-
velopment, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1976). See also Grosspiell, El Derecho Interna-
cional del Desarrollo, CUADERNOS DE LA CATEDRA J.B. Scorr (UNIVERSIDAD DE VALLADOLI)
30 (1975).
38. These demands would include the mandate that the developed world establish a
$300 billion fund for developing nations to borrow from at favorable terms. The position of
the Group of 77 is discussed in Garcia-Amador, The Proposed New International Economic
Order: A New Approach to the Law Governing Nationalization and Compensation, 12
LAW. AM. 1, 36 (1980).
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pirational Declarations are less constructive than those of the
United Nations and are therefore less likely to appear in either of
the two classifications of multinational governance by host nation
law described below.
Aspirational Declarations of a smaller scale are also important
because they illustrate aspirations unhindered by negotiation in a
larger forum, which includes developed nations, and the adver-
sarial atmosphere of the United Nations. An example is the Treaty
Project of the Central American Economic and Social Community,
intended to be a basic document for restructuring the failed Cen-
tral American Common Market. 9 Provisions of the Treaty Project
disclose that the aspirations of these Central American nations in
governing multinationals extend much further than was evident in
the treaty forming the Central American Common Market.40
Aspirational Declarations have not been accepted as constitut-
ing international law by the developed nations. They are viewed as
politically unrealistic and economically unfeasible, and they often
challenge traditionally accepted concepts in the developed world of
private ownership and norms of international law. Some declara-
tions do not purport to be law, such as the Central American
Treaty Project. Others, however, have their proponents who pro-
fess that declarations do constitute international law.4 Forceful
though the arguments may be that some of these declarations con-
stitute an evolving international law, there remains a conflict as to
39. Proyecto del Tratado de la Comunidad Econ6mica y Social Centroamericana,
Comit6 de Alto Nivel Para el Perfeccionamiento y la Reestructuraci6n del Mercado Com(In
Centroamericano (Sieca-Marzo 1976), translated in 2 M. GORDON, CORPORATIONS LAW: MEX-
ICO, CENTRAL AMERICA, PANAMA AND THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET 1.3 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as 2 M. GORDON, MULTINATIONALS].
40. The Treaty Project, which has 311 articles, includes several chapters affecting for-
eign investment, including provisions involving the treatment of foreign capital in Central
America. The treaty obligates the members to adopt a common policy regarding the treat-
ment of foreign capital and the enterprises in which it may participate. The provisions re-
flect the aspirations of the Central American countries to have greater local participation
than may be realistically possible, considering the absence of adequate capital within Cen-
tral America to undertake necessary development or even joint ventures with foreign enter-
prises. There is also little leverage in the smaller nations to dictate joint venture terms to
foreign enterprises in all but a few industries.
41. See supra note 32. Tribunals in developed nations serving as fora to resolve con-
flicts involving multinationals, which raise issues addressed to these Aspirational Declara-
tions, are unlikely to apply these declarations as law other than in exceptional circum-
stances. It is even less likely that the developed nations will allow a suit to commence in the
International Court of Justice (assuming they have a jurisdictional reservation) if there is
any prospect that the Court will either validate the legal status of these declarations or
consider that their substance constitutes another source of international law.
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what constitutes the contemporary framework of international law
governing multinational enterprises. One observation may be ac-
cepted: that international law which governs multinationals is di-
minishing in quantity, or acceptability, or both. Thus, over time,
while multinationals may be able to exist in a framework of greater
restrictiveness, i.e., the Edge of Discouragement slopes upward, the
usefulness of international law regretfully is in decline.







Aspirational Declarations assume particular importance not
because they may constitute international law but rather for what
they disclose regarding current sentiments and possible future law.
They create a norm of expected conduct, a moral code promoted
by developing and socialist nations as proper and reasonable con-
duct for multinationals. But they are more than a moral code.
They may be a precursor of customary international law or they
may become part of the written or unwritten laws of specific host
nations governing foreign investment. The laws and policies of sev-
eral host nations share a close identity with Aspirational Declara-
tions of multi-nation organizations.
Apart from indicators of future action, Aspirational Declara-
tions serve another important function. They offer developing na-
tions strong words which may temper adverse public reaction to
governments plagued by economic political troubles. They may
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serve, in a sense, as doctrines of collective insecurity. They are also
a countervailing organizational participation for developing na-
tions, symbolically offsetting trade associations dominated by de-
veloped world nations such as the World Bank, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, and the International Monetary
Fund. 2
Unsuccessful in gaining an effective voice in those organiza-
tions, multi-nation organizations issuing Aspirational Declarations
allow the developing and socialist nations to dominate the discus-
sions, counter-balance the developed nation organizations, and
provide important fora from which to express their aspirations in
the world trading community. Most importantly, Aspirational Dec-
larations produce new ideas and concepts regarding directions of
international trade. Although they do not dictate rules acceptable
to the developed world, they do disclose goals to be pursued for
decades to come.
On the graph, the Aspirational Declarations would belong
above the older rules of international law now so criticized and re-
jected by socialist and developing nations. In addition, because
they set goals much higher than multinationals accept, they belong
above the Edge of Discouragement. If these declarations were the
norm of regulation, most foreign direct investment would with-
draw. The reluctance of host nations to incorporate these declara-
tions into their domestic law, and the Operational Code's extreme
variances from the concepts of the declarations also reinforces that
they are more restrictive than is acceptable.
42. United Nations representatives from many of the developing nations have urged
the U.N. to use its facilities to influence these organizations. A United Nations General
Assembly Resolution in November, 1982, with only the negative votes of the United States,
Britain and West Germany, opposed an International Monetary Fund loan to South Africa.
The IMF has a separate charter, although it is officially an affiliate of the United Nations.
The charter places power in the IMF with the largest contributors, a position similar to that
in the GATT. Third world challenges to these institutions assume a risk. Were power within
these organizations to shift to the third world, it is quite predictable that the major contrib-
utors would reduce their participation, and create a new organization among the major de-
veloped nations to deal with the issues traditionally negotiated in the IMF and the GATT.
See Some U.N. Leaders Push to Control IMF as Part of Plan for 'New Economic Order',







VI. GOVERNANCE BY THE HOST NATION
A. The Public Code
If one is asked how multinationals are governed, the common
response is to concentrate exclusively on those written laws of the
host nations which directly or indirectly regulate foreign direct in-
vestment. This is the second level of governance, which will be re-
ferred to as the Public Code.43 This code is written and it is law, in
contrast to the Aspirational Declarations, which are written but
43. The word code as opposed to law is used to avoid confusion with the numerous
meanings attached to the term "public law." The use of the word "public" is to emphasize
the broad distribution of this category of rules. Availability to the public is an important
element of the definition. Sometimes laws are enacted which are not disclosed to the public,
a group which forms part of what is discussed below under the label of the Operational
Code.
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are not law. A nation's Public Code includes constitutional provi-
sions affecting direct foreign investment (such as labor and social
security rules), statutes, published administrative regulations and
widely distributed regulations or decisions of foreign investment
agencies.
Examples of the Public Code in three developing nations from
different parts of the world, and a socialist nation, should identify
the type of written laws most commonly governing foreign direct
investment. The first developing nation, Mexico, includes in its
regulatory scheme three general investment laws: the Investment
Law,4 the Transfer of Technology Law,45 and the Inventions and
Tradenames Law.4 6 It further includes specific industry laws, such
as the Automotive Industry Decree, and the Mining Law,47 as well
as several special topic laws such as the provisions affecting the
border assembly industries,48 and export promotion or decentrali-
zation laws."9
While the Mexican Public Code governing foreign direct in-
vestment is one of the most detailed, many other third world na-
tions have foreign investment laws which provide the basic Public
44. Ley para Promover Ia Inversi6n Mexicana y Regular la Inversi6n Extranjera, Feb.
7, 1973, D.O., Mar. 9, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Mexican Investment Law], translated in 1
M. GORDON, MULTINATIONALS, supra note 11, at B.2. See also I. GOMEZ-PALACiO, ANALISIS DE
LA LEY DE INVERSI6N EXTRANJERA EN MtXICO (1974); Gordon, The Contemporary Mexican
Approach to Growth with Foreign Investment: Controlled But Participatory Indepen-
dence, 10 CAL. W.L. REv. 1 (1972).
45. Ley Sobre el Control y Registro de Is Transferencia de Technologia y el Uso y
Explotaci6n de Patentes y Marcas, Dec. 29, 1981, D.O., Jan. 11, 1982 [hereinafter cited as
1981 Mexican Transfer of Technology Law], translated in 1 M. GORDON, MULTINATIONALS,
supra note 11, at B.2b. This law replaced the earlier transfer of technology law, the Ley
Sobre el Registro de la Transferencia de Tecnologia y el Uso y Explotaci6n de Patentes y
Marcas, Dec. 28, 1972, D.O., Dec. 30, 1972 [hereinafter cited as 1972 Mexican Transfer of
Technology Law], translated in 1 M. GORDON, MULTINATIONALS, supra note 11, at B.2d.
46. Ley de Invensiones y Marcas, Dec. 30, 1975, D.O., Feb. 10, 1976 [hereinafter cited
as Mexican Inventions and Trademarks Law], translated in 1 M. GORDON, MULTINATIONALS,
supra note 11, at B.2c.
47. Decree for the Promotion of the Automotive Industry, June 16, 1977, D.O., June
20, 1977, translated in 1 M. GORDON, MULTINATIONALS, supra note 11, at B.3; Ley Regla-
mentaria del Articulo 27 Constitucional en Materia Miners, Dec. 10, 1975, D.O., Dec. 22,
1975.
48. The border zone is governed by the United States Tariff Code, Items 806.30 and
807.00, the Mexican Customs Code, art. 321, and a series of Mexican decrees providing for
special incentives to do business in that zone. These provisions are contained in I M.
GORDON, MULTINATIONALS, supra note 11, at B.5.
49. The 1979-82 National Industrial Development Plan provided a framework for of-
fering export promotion and decentralization incentives. An abridged version of the plan
and several decrees are included in 1 M. GORDON, MULTINATIONALS, supra note 11, at B.4.
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Code framework. The Indian Foreign Exchange Registration Act
encompasses some elements of the Mexican Investment Law and
Transfer of Technology Law.50 Nigeria has a similar arrangement
in its Enterprises Promotion Decree, 1 which contains schedules
outlining different types of ownership classifications requiring total
Nigerian ownership, Nigerian majority interest and majority for-
eign interest.5 2
Yugoslavia has been a leader in the development of joint ven-
ture legislation in the socialist nations. Its initial 1973 law resulted
in numerous investment ventures. 3 Other East European nations
also altered their Public Codes to allow joint ventures in the early
1970s, followed by the more recent laws in China and Cuba.64
A nation's Public Code often includes one general investment
law theoretically applicable to all foreign direct investment. In ac-
tuality, very large investments, particularly extractive mining, pe-
troleum or petrochemical enterprises, emerge from direct contrac-
tual arrangements with the host government. The pattern among
nations is inconsistent. In one nation there may only be one gen-
eral investment law and no specific industry laws. Another nation
may have both a general investment law and specific industry laws.
Many dependent nations, which rarely possess the leverage to
enforce a general investment law similar to those present in the
advanced developing countries and the socialist nations, neverthe-
less may have specific industry laws.55 These industry laws, usually
50. Indian Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1973. See 1982 Bus. INT'L 92 (Mar.
19).
51. Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1977, 6 INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE
WORLD (ICSID 1982) [hereinafter cited as Nigerian Investment Law]. See E. NWOGUGU, THE
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1965); Tobi, Legal
Aspects of Foreign Investment in Nigeria, 18 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 17 (1978).
52. Nigeria may not yet qualify as an advanced developing nation. Its law may be too
restrictive in contrast to the leverage possessed by the government to attract foreign direct
investment in the quantity needed for rapid growth.
53. The initial Yugoslav law on foreign investment was enacted in 1968. A new law
was enacted in 1973, and the current law was adopted in 1978. See Law on Investment of
Foreign Resources in Domestic Organizations of Associated Labor, Sluzbeni list SFRJ, No.
40/78, July 14, 1978 [hereinafter cited as Yugoslav Joint Venture Law].
54. See supra notes 5-9.
55. Examples are the Petroleum Law in Guatemala and the Forestry Law in Hondu-
ras. Petroleum Law of the Nation (Guatemala), Decree 96-75, Dec. 10, 1975, Diario del Cen-
tro America, No. 83, Dec. 22, 1975, translated in 2 M. GORDON, MULTINATIONALS, supra note
39, at C.3; Law for the Honduran Corporation for Forestry Development, Decree Law No.
103, Jan. 10, 1974, La Gaceta, Jan., 1974, translated in 2 M. GORDON, MULTINATIONALS,
supra note 39, at E.3. (neither Guatemala nor Honduras has a general law regulating foreign
investment).
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addressed to the most important primary commodity production,
may mark the early development of a restrictive Public Code in
the small dependent nations. But again the pattern is inconsis-
tent. 5 6 Some dependent nations choose to contractually negotiate
each major investment, without relying on either a general invest-
ment law or a law governing the specific industry.5
7
Exceptionally large projects in even the most advanced devel-
oping countries may also be governed by a special contract negoti-
ated with and approved by the government instead of specific in-
dustry laws or a general investment law. The Jari project of Mr.
Daniel Ludwig, for example, was negotiated directly with the Bra-
zilian Government. It was too large and complex to be regulated
effectively by the Brazilian Investment Law of 1962.58 Even where
a nation has both a general investment law and a specific industry
law, any project of an exceptional magnitude for the country is
likely to be treated as sui generis, with many elements of the in-
56. Investment incentive laws usually precede the adoption of specific industry laws in
these dependent nations. Incentive laws are designed to encourage the entry of foreign in-
vestment, and usually include comparatively little regulation of that industry. The specific
industry laws are often the first laws adopted to commence a pattern of restricting or regu-
lating invited foreign investment.
57. The reasons for independent negotiation of each major investment may be diverse.
The nation may possess newly discovered resources, and negotiate the exploitation of those
resources before there has been time to draft and implement a specific industry law; or the
resources may be so concentrated as to suggest only a single investment in one industry,
tending to negate the feasibility of enacting a formal Public Code governing structure when
only one foreign investor will participate; or there may be cultural reasons. For example, the
Chinese law permitting joint ventures received adverse criticism leveled not at what it in-
cluded, but at what it omitted. In contrast to joint venture laws of socialist nations in East-
ern Europe, the Chinese law appeared to overlook provisions governing much of the invest-
ment relationship. Potential investors misunderstood the cultural impact of China on the
enactment of laws. Much is left to negotiation. China does not have an extensively codified
legal system. But, sensing the uncertainty created by their brief joint venture law, the Chi-
nese authorities added to the regulatory framework of the Public Code additional provisions
which markedly increased foreign investor interest.
58. The Ludwig Group Enterprises, traceable to two parent corporations in Bermuda
(Universal Tankships, Inc.) and Liberia (Seatankers, Inc.), involves a complex corporate
structure with at least ten Brazilian enterprises which participated in various aspects of the
Amazon project. But the project suffered one of the endemic diseases of massive, extractive
industries; it became a focal point of nationalism and was taken over by Brazilians in 1982.
See 1982 Bus. LAT. AM. 42 (Feb. 10); 1981 Bus. LAT. AM. 59 (Feb. 25); 1981 Bus. LAT. AM.
309 (Sept. 30). See also Law No. 4,131 of Sept. 3, 1962, as modified by Law No. 4,390 of
Aug. 29, 1964. The Operational Code in Brazil is no less complex. See Rosenn, Treatment of
the Foreign Investor: The Brazilian Style, THE FUTURE OF BRAZIL 245 (W. Overholt ed.
1973); Rosenn, Trends in Brazilian Regulation of Business, 13 LAw. AM. 169 (1981); Row-
land, Foreign Investment in Brazil: A Reconciliation of Perspectives, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON.
39 (1979).
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vestment negotiated directly with the government.
Foreign investors proposing a project of exceptional size do
gain some insight from reading the Public Code. It affords a basic
outline of how a country treats foreign investment. Also, attention
to general principles drawn from the Operational Code will aid
multinationals in determining how they are expected to conduct
their investments. Still, the investment will most likely be the re-
sult of a negotiated contract. There are benefits to a negotiated
contract in that the company and government are likely to deal
with questions that are not often discussed when the investment
begins through registration and approval of only limited elements
of the investment.
In the socialist nations a government contract initiates all di-
rect investment, instead of a Western-type organization and regis-
tration of a corporation. Western biased assumptions, which may
prove erroneous, cannot be made when no corporation, as known in
the West, exists. Instead the entity is a unique creation of the eco-
nomic law of the socialist nation. Resolution of questions in the
contract reduces not only the likelihood of surprise and consequent
embarrassment, but more importantly, it lessens the possibility of
serious harmful economic consequences at a later time. This is the
reason for the favorable references by Western investors to the
"negative surprise ratio" in Eastern Europe.
Many Public Code laws overlook the needs of small and me-
dium size investments, and are not very useful for large invest-
ments which are governed by direct contracts with the govern-
ment. The complexity of the Public Code is not what usually
discourages small and medium size investment. It is more often
that these investors are unable to comprehend and find their way
through the labyrinth of the Operational Code.
Although a nation's Public Code governing foreign direct in-
vestment may be extensive, it serves as the basis-the mental
framework-of regulation of foreign direct investment for that de-
veloping nation. But even in those nations which have an extensive
Public Code, multinational advisors should not rely on that written
law as constituting the total framework of investment regulation.
Awareness of the Operational Code is necessary, as is awareness of
any impact that the nation's participation in Aspirational Declara-




The Public Codes in several developing and socialist nations
illustrate the diversity of development modes adopted by these na-
tions. Multinationals frequently initiate foreign direct investment
activity by entering a single, comparatively safe developing nation
and assuming that the framework of regulation in that nation con-
stitutes a norm of regulation for other nations at a similar level of
development. It is an assumption which may cause the multina-
tional substantial confusion and economic distress when it enters
other nations possessing very different attitudes toward the gov-
ernance of foreign investment.
A multinational entering Mexico and referring to its Public
Code, as well as a history of the Mexican attitude toward foreign
investment,59 will note a framework with a comparatively high de-
gree of restrictiveness toward the entry and operation of a foreign
direct investment. Until recent currency regulations were passed,
there was at least some relative freedom of exchange of profits
from local to foreign currencies, with repatriation to the parent
home office. In contrast, the Brazilian foreign investment law and
attitude toward initiating foreign direct investment over the last
few decades has been less restrictive, if measured by the Public
Code. Brazil, however, has been particularly restrictive in regulat-
ing currency.6
Little research has been conducted on how initial foreign in-
vestments of multinational enterprises affect their attitude toward
expanding investment to other nations. Nonetheless, the order in
which multinationals enter different developing and socialist coun-
tries having markedly different attitudes toward foreign invest-
ment undoubtedly affects their decisions about future investments.
Both the Aspirational Declarations and the Public Code serve to
placate public demand for a strong national posture regarding for-
eign investment. Actual investment decisions of the national gov-
erning elite, however, often occur in the shadow, effectuated
through the Operational Code. The public believes there is cer-
tainty to the law and the government is able to legislate unrealis-
tic, restrictive measures towards multinationals. The government is
able to deal pragmatically with individual foreign direct invest-
59. See Gordon, The Joint Venture as an Institution for Mexican Development: A
Legislative History, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 173. See generally H. WRIGHT, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE
IN MEXICO: LAWS AND POLICIES (1971).
60. See generally Rosenn, supra note 13.
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ments through effective escape valves in the Public Code"' and the
nonpublic functioning of the Operational Code.
Placing the Public Code on our graph creates some difficulty
because the graph generally applies to foreign direct investment in
developing and socialist nations. Conclusions drawn as to the plot-
ting of the restrictiveness over time are limited to an increasing
degree of restrictiveness, or an upward sloping line, because Public
Codes differ from nation to nation. It is preferable to show this line
not as a constantly increasing line but one which increases in ab-
rupt increments. Elements of the Public Code are enacted periodi-
cally, usually when the Operational Code has become so cumber-
some and confusing that it is necessary to transfer some elements
to the Public Code. This reduces investor confusion and increases
predictability for those investors only familiar with the Public
Code.
The step used on the graph illustrates an upward movement
at various stages in time. The line obviously is below the Edge of
Discouragement and, therefore, below the Aspirational Declara-
tions line. The relationship of the Public Code line to the dimin-
ishing content of international law is more difficult in that the lat-
ter is not intended to be compared in its degree of restrictiveness
with the Public Code, but to indicate that the quantum of interna-
61. The earlier Mexican Transfer of Technology law placed severe restrictions on the
type and means of admittance of technology into Mexico. 1972 Mexican Transfer of Tech-
nology Law, supra note 45, art. 7, D.O., Dec. 30, 1972, translated in I M. GORDON, MULTINA-
TIONALS, supra note 11, at B.2b. An exception was allowed where the technology was "of
special interest to the country." Id., art. 8. Several of the restrictions, however, were not
subject to the exception. Id. This suggested that waivers were not given for any of those
restrictions, or that a separate Operational Code existed which required a greater quid pro
quo than that required for the granting of an ordinary exception. The current 1981 law
retains the exceptions, but deletes the provisions that limit them. D.O., Jan. 11, 1982, trans-
lated in 1 M. GORDON, MULTINATIONALS, supra note 11, at B.2b. The Nigerian Enterprises
Promotion Decree contains a provision with the potential for creation of a broad Opera-
tional Code. The government is permitted to alter the lists of enterprises which state in
three schedules which enterprises are reserved exclusively for Nigerians, which must be at
least 60% or more owned by Nigerians, and which require at least 40% or more to be Niger-
ian. The government may vary some of the minimum Nigerian ownership percentage figures
in the law, and it may even "make such different provisions in relation to different enter-
prises or as respects different areas of the Federations, and impose such terms as he [Com-
missioner of Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board] may deem necessary." Nigerian Invest-
ment Law, supra note 51, at art. 16.
The Yugoslav law is more detailed in its governance of the limited foreign equity partic-
ipation in direct investment allowed in Yugoslavia. But it does contain exception provisions.
A joint venture agreement may be approved even if it does not increase exports, if "such
contract is likely to contribute to the faster development of the economic branch or activity
concerned." Yugoslav Joint Venture Law, supra note 53, at art. 42.
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tional law governing multinationals is diminishing over time. The
addition of the Public Code line to the graph results in a more







B. The Operational Code
A nation may have a restrictive Public Code, but with a leni-
ent Operational Code it may be more receptive to foreign direct
investment than another nation with a lenient Public Code and
strict Operational Code. One must understand both. Functioning
solely from the Public Code will create expectations which the Op-
erational Code will soon dispel.
The Operational Code, the third control level, is the pivotal
concept for multinational enterprises to understand. It is impor-
tant largely because it is not written, or where written is not pub-
licly disclosed. Indeed, by definition it may not be publicly dis-
closed. When elements of the Operational Code become so well-
known to the investing community and are no longer considered
secret, these elements tend to assume the status of the Public
Code, yet remain unwritten. There is consequently a small part of
the Public Code which is not formally written. But it is likely to
become part of the Public Code in its next revision. Nevertheless,
[Vol. 16:2
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the government may continue to deny its existence in the face of
overwhelming public acknowledgment of its existence.
The definition of the Operational Code suggests that it is lim-
ited to formal unwritten regulations and decisions, but it may also
include formal written regulations and decisions which either are
not publicly available or discoverable. Two examples of written el-
ements of the Operational Code illustrate this point. The National
Commission on Foreign Investment in Mexico reviews petitions
from foreign investors requesting exceptions from the Mexican In-
vestment Law.2 A company may request a waiver from the re-
quirement of Mexicanization to allow it to expand its current pro-
duction at a new location or begin production of new products.
Both, without being granted an exception, require Mexicanization
of the entire company."
The Commission's written decisions are not released to the
public, but they disclose a great deal about the Operational Code
and the criteria the government applies in reaching decisions on
these petitions. Over time, these decisions are obtained by some of
the Mexican lawyers representing multinationals and their release
eventually will become so extensive they will be common knowl-
edge." They will then no longer be part of the Operational Code
but will be transformed by the extent of the public knowledge to
the Public Code. These decisions are already written and consti-
tute pronouncements of an entity with decisionmaking authority,
therefore, there is no need to pass through the formal legislative
process to become part of the Public Code. When the Public Code
is next revised, these concepts may be integrated into the invest-
ment regulation laws.
In contrast to formerly non-disclosed pronouncements, there
are regulations issued by various ministries which have not been
kept secret. Although technically part of the Public Code, they ex-
ist in such large numbers and are so difficult to locate that they
must be considered part of the Operational Code. Brazilian lawyers
deal with such rules in the form of what are known as "drawer"
regulations. These are regulations which have been issued by vari-
ous ministries which, even though not labeled secret, have not been
publicly disseminated. They are kept in a ministry official's
62. Mexican Investment Law, supra note 44, at art. 12.
63. See Gomez-Palacio, Defining "New Lines of Products" Under Mexico's Foreign
Investment Law, 8 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 74 (1978).
64. Mexican Investment Law, supro note 44, art. 12. See, e.g., supra note 63.
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drawer, removed on one occasion, and left in the drawer on an-
other. Even when a drawer regulation is noted by the official it
may be applied with an inconsistency permitted by the lack of
public disclosure. Both the Mexican Commission decisions and
these Brazilian regulations may be considered part of the Opera-
tional Code, although they are in fact written decisions and
regulations.
The Operational Code is always somewhat at variance with the
Public Code, but it must not deviate from the Public Code so ex-
tensively that it generates so much uncertainty that it reduces for-
eign investor confidence in the regulatory structure. The Opera-
tional Code directly conflicts with the Public Code when, although
positive law provisions of the Public Code do not contain excep-
tions, the law is waived according to the Operational Code. Any
such waiver would be an Operational Code provision directly con-
trary to written law which would constitute a serious source of mis-
understanding for potential foreign investors. This would be a far
more serious problem than where a sizeable variance exists be-
tween the Codes only in an. indirect form. A direct conflict with the
Public Code may lead to litigation against a host country over the
Operational Code.
An indirect variance exists when positive statements of the
Public Code are conditioned by exception provisions, but the gov-
ernment so routinely grants exceptions that the positive law effec-
tively becomes a nullity. It is a potential source of conflict because
unknowing foreign investors may believe the Public Code to be
routinely applied. If the variance between the Operational Code
and Public Code becomes extreme, it is mandatory, and in the best
interest of a nation, that it pass a new investment law. The new
law should add to the Public Code those elements of the Opera-
tional Code the government wishes to acknowledge as now being
appropriately part of the Public Code and those which it believes
create unacceptable conflicts by remaining within the Operational
Code. The government will still not acknowledge Operational Code
provisions it does not want admitted to the public. For example,
Operational Code requirements mandating payments to govern-
ment officials to expedite services, granting exceptions, or even re-
fusing to enforce the Public Code, are not appropriate subjects to
publicly acknowledge, and thus remain perpetually hidden in the
Operational Code.
During the 1950s and 1960s the Mexican government imposed
[Vol. 16:2
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the equity joint venture form of investment upon many foreign in-
vestors through the Operational Code. Foreign investors, expecting
to own one hundred percent of their subsidiaries in Mexico under
the Public Code, were often unable to initiate an investment unless
in the joint venture form. The Emergency Decree of 1944 required
joint ventures in certain areas of activities,65 but the Decree was
rescinded by the termination of emergency powers at the end of
World War I.66 In spite of the rescission, the government contin-
ued to require the establishment of joint ventures on the basis of
the Emergency Decree. When challenged, the Mexican Supreme
Court ruled the Decree no longer in effect." If many more chal-
lenges had been made to the Emergency Decree, the Mexican gov-
ernment would have enacted an investment law much sooner than
1973, and would have incorporated the Operational Code mandate
of the joint venture. It was a mandate which nearly all multina-
tionals respected: either accept the joint venture or obtain an ex-
emption. While a new law might offer some predictability regard-
ing joint ventures, it also might add new restrictive provisions
which multinationals rarely wish to promote.
In the 1950s, the Mexican government began to issue Mixed
Ministerial Commission decisions. They constituted regulations of
foreign investment, but were not publicly available. 8 They were
released to lawyers over the next decade, however, much in the
fashion of the decisions of the National Commission on Foreign
Investment. In the 1960s, the Mixed Ministerial Commission's de-
cisions became publicly known and published in a treatise on for-
eign investment law. 9 There was substantial confusion on the part
65. Decree of June 29, 1944, D.O., July 7, 1944, art. 1. See Note, Foreign Investment
in Mexico: The Emergency Decree of 1944, 39 Tui. L. REV. 538 (1965).
66. Decree of Sept. 28, 1945, D.O., Dec. 28, 1945.
67. See Quimica Industrial de Monterrey, S.A., Corte Suprema de Justicia de Mexico
(Segunda Sala), Sept. 20, 1962. 66 Seminario Judicial: Sexta Epoca 25 (1963). The chal-
lenges were directed at the Operational Code; the Mexican government used the Emergency
Decree to justify its restrictive action.
The process of amparo, which protects individual constitutional rights in Mexico, was
the form used to initiate these challenges. An amparo suit only results in a ruling that the
law as applied to the petitioner is invalid. Thus, each affected individual must decide
whether to bring his own amparo and the law remains effective and enforceable against all
others unless it is repealed. See R. BAKER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MEXICO: A STUDY OF THE
AMPARO SUIT (1971).
68. The directives were mimeographed but never issued to the public. They are dis-
cussed in Gordon, The Joint Venture as an Institution for Mexican Development: A Legis-
lative History, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 173.
69. 0. RAMOS GARZA, MEXICO ANTE LA INVERSI6N EXTRANJERA 380-88 (1974).
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of multinational advisors operating in Mexico in the late 1960s, as
to the applicable law governing foreign investment, because the
Operational Code had become the major element of governance of
multinationals. There was no general investment law and little
that could be labeled the Public Code. Many multinationals not
familiar with the Operational Code shied away from investments in
Mexico because of the lack of predictability.
In 1972 and 1973 Mexico passed its Transfer of Technology
Law and Investment Law."0 Not surprisingly, the issuance of those
laws brought forth comments that the rules of the game had
changed.7 But they had not been significantly altered. Through
these newly written laws, the Mexican government had incorpo-
rated much of the Operational Code into the Public Code. This
was understood by many foreign investors, but it created confusion
for others, especially many medium and smaller firms which de-
cided not to invest in Mexico because of the uncertainties of the
written regulatory framework.
To place the Operational Code in the graph it must be empha-
sized that Operational Codes by their nature are not well defined.
But for a general representation the line should relate to the Pub-
lic Code and move upwards without the abrupt steps of the Public
Code since the Operational Code is constantly undergoing
modification.
It is as important for a host nation government to be aware of
the divergence of its Operational Code from the Public Code, as it
is for multinationals to be aware of that divergence and the pro-
gressively changing content of the Operational Code. A company
failing to appreciate these movements is not in a secure position to
predict future movements if it is ignorant of the existence of the
Operational Code and the degree to which it varies from the Public
Code. In some cases, particularly in the small dependent nations,
the government tries to maintain a narrow gap between the Public
Code and the Operational Code. If a dominant multinational en-
terprise in that nation is able to influence the Operational Code, it
may function according to a lenient Operational Code but defend
its actions on the basis of the more restrictive Public Code. The
70. See supra notes 44-45.
71. United States Ambassador to Mexico Robert H. McBride stated: "Many [inves-
tors] are unclear as to whether or not foreign investment is still desired [in Mexico] and
whether the rules of the game are changing, not only for new investment but also for estab-
lished firms." Miami Herald, Jan. 21, 1973, at 21-G, col. 1.
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Aspirational Declarations





graph of such a nation would show a more restrictive Public Code
than the Operational Code (at least for the dominant investor)."z
There may be a benefit to the nation because it limits the single,
dominant multinational to benefiting from the lenient Operational
Code and enforces the more restrictive Public Code for other new
72. But in some dependent nations, the government has been able to narrow the gap
between a lenient Operational Code and a strict Public Code, after the foreign investor has
made a large capital investment in the country. The enterprise is then more susceptible to
pressures to alter its investment to make it more favorable to the country. This process may
create a tense relationship in that both parties realize the country is relying on the single
commodity for much of its gross national product. The government wants to extract maxi-
mum benefit for the nation, without causing the multinational to withdraw, while the mul-
tinational argues that it is always on the brink of losses, and any further restrictions would
lead to its withdrawal. Often there is no Public Code in a dependent nation other than
investment incentive laws directed to less dominant industries. The relationship between
the nation and a dominant industry may bhe subject of a contractual agreement 
rather
than the Public Code, or it may be governed by a specific industry law, which means there is
a Public Code for that industry. One is then able to create a graph of the scheme of regula-
tion for that particular industry.
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investments.
The Operational Code has numerous facets. It has different
rules applicable to multinationals with different levels of power to
demand a lenient Operational Code. It reflects the nation's need to
be flexible so as to obtain investment, particularly in crucial areas.
The Operational Code under which IBM functions in many na-
tions, where its computer technology has a monopoly position and
where such a monopoly is of critical need to development, is in
stark contrast to the Operational Code applicable to a multina-
tional entering an industry saturated by domestic-owned enter-
prises. The Operational Code applicable to IBM may be less re-
strictive than the Public Code, while that applicable to the latter
multinational may be so severely restrictive that it works to elimi-
nate foreign direct investment which will compete with inefficient
local industry.
The Operational Code occupies an important position in a
host nation's governance of foreign direct investment because it al-
lows the government to unequally treat multinational enterprises.
An investor with leverage may be able to enter without accepting a
joint venture with majority host nation equity, but other enter-
prises, even those manufacturing similar products, may be required
to comply with a Public Code mandating the joint ventures. More
important than permitting unequal treatment, however; is that a
potentially unpopular, flexible, Operational Code, is hidden from
public criticism. Nationalistic pressures may have caused the en-
actment of a restrictive Public Code for foreign investment. Conse-
quently, the public is permitted to think nationalistically while the
government is able to function pragmatically.
There is an interrelationship between the Operational Code
and Aspirational Declarations. While Aspirational Declarations
have infrequently become part of Public Codes, these aspirations
often are tested within the Operational Code. They tend not to
become part of the Public Code because they are severely restric-
tive, likely to discourage foreign direct investment, and force mul-
tinationals to seek alternative host nations without severe Public
Codes. The Operational Code may serve as a substitute to a re-
strictive Public Code so that the country may be restrictive in
mandating conduct of foreign direct investment in accordance with
norms established in Aspirational Declarations, while maintaining




Additionally, the Operational Code may permit a nation to im-
pose factors in making foreign investment decisions beyond the
scope of economics, such as denying permission for a proposed in-
vestment for cultural reasons, or because of concern for the impact
of the investment on the political structure. One example involves
the Kentucky Fried Chicken enterprise in Mexico. The company
applied to the National Commission on Foreign Investment for
permission to add new franchise outlets in Mexico without altering
the wholly foreign owned status of the investment. The request
was denied. The reasons, though briefly stated, indicated that the
government believed there was already adequate service of chicken
in restaurants in Mexico, a reason directly consistent with the In-
vestment Law.7 3 The Commission, however, also alluded to the fact
that it questioned the desirability of additional chicken prepara-
tion in Mexico based on a foreign style of cooking, illustrating the
concern for the cultural impact. It was consistent with Aspirational
Declarations which suggest that multinationals should respect so-
cial and cultural norms in the developing nations in which they
invest."4 Hence, the Operational Code provides a location for a
host nation to hide decisions based on norms contained in Aspira-
tional Declarations but which have not yet been made a part of the
Public Code.
75
The Operational Code concept is not new. There is evidence
that the harsh measures of the Code of Hammurabi of the Babylo-
nian Empire were not as severely applied in actual practice.7 " Ro-
73. The Mexican law states that investment must "respect the country's social and
cultural values." Mexican Investment Law, supra note 44, art. 13 (XIV). The Public Code
therefore does refer to culture as a reason for denying an investment, but it leaves definition
of cultural and social values to the Operational Code. Economic values are more clearly
defined because ambiguity in that sphere would frustrate and discourage most foreign inves-
tors who demand full definition of economic values considered by the Mexican government.
74. This information was gathered from conversations with Mexican attorneys and
persons familiar with the company's petition. The decision is one of those few elements of
the Operational Code which exists in writing, but is not available to the public.
75. Even in Aspirational Declarations, statements regarding cultural values are not de-
fined. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States declares that nations have the
right to choose their own social and cultural systems (art. 1); to require that multinational
enterprises comply with social policy (art. 2); to pursue different social systems (art. 4); to
promote the social and cultural developments of their people, and to receive the cooperation
of all states in such promotion (art. 7); to expect that cooperation to extend to social and
cultural progress in the world (art. 10); and be free from social consequences of foreign
domination (art. 16). Charter on Economic Rights, supra note 37.
76. Professor Reisman states:
The locus classicus of myth systems and operational codes is probably the
Code of Hammurabi, a massive casuistic code [essentially] designed to guide de-
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man law contained extensive Operational Code concepts in conflict
with written rules of law.7 In every society there is a variance be-
tween the Public Code and "the way things work."' The Opera-
tional Code, however, should not be assumed to be the exclusive
device of developing economies or socialist nations. Operational
Codes exist in the most developed of economies, although they
tend to vary less with the Public Code than in the former nations.
The often extreme degree of variance between the Operational
Code and the Public Code in developing nations cannot be consid-
ered to enhance development. Combined with an Operational Code
which contains a large number of inconsistencies, it is understand-
able that most prospective foreign direct investment is turned
away.
VII. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE THREE-TIERS OF GOVERNANCE
It should be useful to consider several areas involving foreign
direct investment and to comment on their interrelationship with
the three control levels. Such comparison will illustrate how differ-
ent levels of control are used to respond to the impact of multina-
tional enterprises on political, economic, social, and cultural insti-
tutions. Each subject matter will not necessarily be reflected on all
three control levels, and in a given case there may be no Aspira-
cision makers of the ancient Babylonian Empire in a wide range of their official
activities. There is substantial reason to believe that Hammurabi's code was
never applied; those charged with making decisions and those seeking decisions
from officials operated on the basis of an entirely different code of norms.
W.M. REISMAN, FOLDED LIES 17 (1979), citing generally G. DRIVER & J. MILES, 1 THE
BABYLONIAN LAWS (1952, corrected reprint, 1956); J. Finkelstein, Ammisaduqa's Edict and
Babylonian 'Law Codes', JOURNAL OP CUNEIFORM STUDIES 91 (1961).
77. The major division of the Roman law was the ius civile, the law for citizens, and
the ius gentium, the law for all others. Before the development of the ius gentium, the
foreigner was strictly a person without status or property. He and his property could be
seized as items without any owner. He could not enter court to sue for he had no standing.
Jolowicz and Nicholas doubt, however, that this was true in practice. See H. JoLowlcz & B.
NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 102 (1972).
78. Gandhi wrote of pre-British India:
ITihere was not such a thing as rigid Hindu Law governing the lives of mil-
lions. The body of regulations known as Smritis were indicative rather than in-
flexible codes of conduct. They never had the validity of law such as is known to
modern lawyers. The observance of the restraints of the Smritis was enforced
more by social than legal sanctions. The Smritis were, as is evident from the
self-contradictory verses to be found in them, continually passing, like ourselves,
through evolutionary changes, and were adapted to the new discoveries that
were being made in social science.
M. GANDHI, THE LAW AND THE LAWYERS 222 (1962).
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tional Declaration, while a Public Code and Operational Code both
exist. Where Aspirational Declarations and Operational Codes re-
garding the same subject matter both exist, they disclose a great
deal about the effect of the Operational Code upon multinational
enterprises.
An Aspirational Declaration that suggests a large measure of
restrictiveness and an Operational Code disclosing a very lenient
attitude may exist in either a dependent or an advanced develop-
ing country. In the small dependent nation the Operational Code
may be lenient in its application to all investment. In the larger
advanced developing country it may reflect a specific large and
needed foreign direct investment, and a less restrictive form of the
Operational Code applied to that particular enterprise.
Examples of economic relations and the interrelationship of
the three control levels reflect the influence of foreign direct in-
vestment at the point of entry, during operation, and at voluntary
or involuntary withdrawal. Much attention has focused on how for-
eign direct investment is permitted to enter a nation. Not surpris-
ingly, nations prefer to have a large percentage of the means of
production and distribution in the hands of nationals. But Aspira-
tional Declarations have not suggested total ownership and control
over the means of production and distribution. The non-industrial-
ized world accepts that industrialization will occur only, or more
rapidly, with the assistance of the developed world through the
participation of foreign direct investment.
Total ownership and control might be achieved through the
exclusion of any foreign direct equity investments, relying for de-
velopment solely on the import and export of goods, the receipt of
technology through the licensing agreements, and the development
of turnkey and cooperation concepts familiar in the socialist na-
tions. But this is not believed sufficient to achieve an adequate
base of industrialization. The socialist nations in the last decade
have begun to admit equity foreign direct investment in the form
of joint ventures. Marxist theory includes numerous Aspirational
Declarations including that ownership of the means of production
and distribution is to be in the workers' hands. Joint venture legis-
lation has been adopted in Eastern European nations that recog-
nize the inconsistency of the joint venture with Marxist theory,
justifying the variance on pragmatic grounds of more rapid devel-
opment by a temporary allowance of an anti-Marxist element.
Once the Aspirational Declaration is formed, the Public and
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Operational Codes complete a clear framework. For example, the
Public Code in many nations mandates varying levels of ownership
and control by host country nationals. The Mexican, Nigerian and
Indian Public Codes require joint ventures in nearly all areas in
which foreign investment is permitted.7 9 Characteristically, Opera-
tional Codes directed to the amount of permitted foreign direct in-
vestment vary widely. In nations with restrictive Public Codes, in-
cluding Mexico, Nigeria and India, the Operational Codes appear
to function inconsistently with investment laws by admitting whol-
ly foreign owned investments.
A foreign investment which might be limited to a minority po-
sition may receive permission to retain a majority or even total for-
eign ownership if it satisfies the Operational Code criteria. Such
criteria include location in either a decentralized or high unem-
ployment zone, a guaranteed level of exports or an assurance that
exports will equal or exceed imports, and, perhaps most important,
the introduction of needed technology not otherwise attainable.
There is a distinct trend toward focusing upon the receipt of tech-
nology under terms quite different from former periods. The Oper-
ational Code may allow an investment otherwise excluded if it
brings a technology considered critical for development, or if the
enterprise agrees to establish research facilities in the nation for
the production of technology to be shared by the government."0
79. The Mexican Investment Law prohibits foreign direct investment which does not
have at least 51 percent local ownership. Investment is placed in one of three groups: sectors
reserved exclusively for state ownership, sectors reserved exclusively for Mexicans or Mexi-
can companies, and sectors in which foreign investment is permitted, but limited to 49 per-
cent. Mexican Investment Law, supra note 44, at arts. 4-5. Nigeria also classifies enterprises.
See supra note 61. India limits all firms to a maximum of 40 percent foreign participation,
but allows up to 74 percent in some firms which are export oriented, and provide a source of
technology which India has yet to acquire. India Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. Foreign
investment laws in socialist nations do not include the various classifications as noted in the
laws of Mexico, Nigeria and India. Socialist nations function from the premise that all
means of production and distribution must be state owned (worker owned in Yugoslavia).
Consequently, there is no need to express classifications dividing certain industries between
those exclusively reserved for state ownership and ownership by nationals or foreigners. The
socialist nations have not listed those industries in which they will permit limited foreign
direct investment. They prefer to listen to proposals for investment in nearly any area of
activity which will add modern technology, increase exports, improve the supply of goods to
the domestic market, and promote development.
80. One current method employed to obtain permission from the Mexican authorities
for a wholly foreign owned investment is to establish a research facility in Mexico. This
method is referred to by Mexican lawyers as the "Mexicanization" of technology and is an
indication of the considerable interest of the third world in acquiring more and better tech-
nology through the Operational Code.
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There is an identifiable and predictable pattern in the three
control levels with regard to the entry of foreign direct investment.
Aspirational Declarations suggest a severely restrictive attitude to-
ward foreign participation. But there is a discernable mix of for-
eign involvement in the actual Public Codes: a pragmatic Opera-
tional Code recognizes that Aspirational Declarations and overly
restrictive Public Codes must be sufficiently tempered to assure ac-
cess to industrialized nations' technology and to achieve some bal-
ance in imports and exports which diminishes severe dislocations








Our graph for the entry of foreign investment may differ from
figure 5, which is the general view of the control levels in develop-
ing nations. Where nations have restrictive entry provisions, they
may have an Operational Code line below the Public Code line.
This is consistent with the view that a strict Public Code is good
for local consumption-the multinationals are strictly regu-
lated-and it allows the government to come to terms with realis-
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tic conditions of entry. Thus, the graph for entry to nations with
restrictive Public Codes might appear quite differently.
A second sphere of foreign direct investment which illustrates
the variation in the three control levels is the amount of participa-
tion in management of the business. It is related to the percentage
of ownership issue, for the majority owner usually has at least ma-
jority control over management. Many developing nations' repre-
sentatives initially assume that achieving a status of majority local
ownership will result in local control of management. Thus, invest-
ment laws do not always include provisions governing the constitu-
tion of the managing board.
The Mexican Investment Law addresses this issue and pro-
vides that "participation of foreign investment in the administra-
tion of the business enterprise may not exceed its participation in
the capital."8 1 Even with the adoption of such provisions in Public
Codes, however, the Aspirational Declarations for this area have
not been reached. Private investors appoint persons to manage-
ment boards who are trained in business management, and have
goals similar to their own. Their nationality may not be important
but one important contrast in goals may be a concern of host na-
tion directors about decisions affecting the continued existence of
the firm in the country. It is not very likely that Nigerian partici-
pants on the board of a Nigerian subsidiary of an English parent
would recommend the subsidiary be closed down or removed to a
nation more receptive to foreign direct investment.
In the majority of cases, host nations have viewed laws man-
dating majority participation in the administration as beneficial to
the development of a skilled national sector of business adminis-
trators. If Aspirational Declarations suggest total governance by
host nation administrators, it has been diminished in Operational
Codes by the same attitude affecting mandatory levels of equity.
Management know-how is often as much an element of advanced
technology as a patent. Thus, host nations in their Public Codes
may mandate a majority of their nationals as directors but tend to
be wary of any effect the policy may have to diminish the receipt
of technology by the parent, as well as lessen its ability to achieve
a competitive level. A country will also want to receive other bene-
fits a board composed solely of nationals might not achieve, or a
board with a majority of nationals might lose by rejecting the ad-
81. Mexican Investment Law, supra note 44, at art. 5(c).
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vice of the foreign minority. The Operational Code, consequently,
may allow the foreign minority to govern the enterprise, or allow a
similar diversion of management decisions from a local board to
the foreign parent through the use of a management contract.
Thus, the Public Code would place nationals on the board, but the
Operational Code would allow many major decisions to be decided
by the minority foreign participants.
An area of substantial conflict between developing nations and
multinationals involves a forced alteration of ownership by the
host nation. Whether it takes the form of a one-time directive or of
a creeping nationalization, it has resulted in serious conflicts over
the compensation of the affected enterprise. The Aspirational Dec-
larations are clear in this area. The Declaration of the Establish-
ment of a New International Economic Order stipulates "full per-
manent sovereignty of every State over its natural resources and
all economic activities,"8 and indicates a state has the "right to
nationalization or transfer of ownership to its nationals."8 The
same theory is included in the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States, which also addresses choice of laws with respect
to compensation. The Charter states that "appropriate compensa-
tion should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking
into account its relevant laws and regulations in all circumstances
that the State considers pertinent." 4 The provision further indi-
cates that questions of compensation are to be settled under the
domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless
it is freely and mutually agreed by all states concerned that other
peaceful means be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of
States and in accordance with the principle of free choice of
means.
8 5
The international community of the developed world has long
thought that international law applied to such nationalizations,
and that international standards mandated prompt, adequate and
effective compensation as determined by an international rather
than a domestic tribunal. To argue that provisions of the Charter
constitute a new international law only generates the same dispute
in reverse. It does seem clear, however, that whatever might have
been international law in the past, should hardly be viewed as ei-
82. Declaration of a NIEO, supra note 36, art. 4(e), at 799-800.
83. Id.




ther generally accepted throughout the world community or as
very useful for the resolution of disputes.
The Public Codes of host nations have varied in dealing with
nationalization. Mexico addressed the issue after its 1910-1917
Revolution, most expressively, by the expropriation of foreign oil
interests in 1938.6 The Mexican position was clear: the Public
Code provided for compensation according to Mexican law and as
determined by Mexican courts.8 Few nations, however, have a
Public Code as close to the Aspirational Declaration as did Mexico.
Mexico's position, expressed in correspondence immediately after
the 1938 expropriations, was never again included in congression-
ally issued legislation.
It is not unusual to find an investment law provision of a mar-
ket economy developing nation which requires compensation for
nationalization. The provision may even require compensation to
be paid before, at the time of, or promptly after, the nationaliza-
tion. Such legislation is enacted by regimes trying to establish a
climate receptive to foreign direct investment. But many of the
most notable and large-scale nationalizations have occurred subse-
quent to a major change in government, often the result of a
revolution, a military takeover of a civilian government or a popu-
lar civilian election replacing a military government.8 New laws
are adopted which, although usually providing for compensation,
may add elements which effectively negate even the possibility of
such payment.8 9
Aspirational Declarations in the area of the entry of foreign
direct investment tend to be undefined, while the Public Codes are
carefully constructed around a joint venture requirement. This
86. F. ALONSO GONZALEZ, HISTORIA Y PETROLEO (1972); A. BERMUDEZ, THE MEXICAN
NATIONAL PETROLEUM INDUSTRY: A CASE STUDY IN NATIONALIZATION (1963); J. SILVIA
HERZOG, LA EXPROPIACION DEL PETROLEO EN MEXICO (1963); R. GAITHER, EXPROPRIATION IN
MEXICO: THE FACTS AND THE LAW (1940); Kunz, The Mexican Expropriations, 17 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 327 (1940); Woolsey, The Expropriation of Oil Properties in Mexico, 32 AM. J. INT'L L.
519 (Supp. 1938).
87. Correspondence between Mexico and the United States outlining the different po-
sitions of the two countries and the resolution of the issue is contained in 3 G. HACKWORTH,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 655-65 (1942); XIX U.S. Department of State Press Releases
50, 136, 139, 165 (1938).
88. Few nationalizations have reached the dimension of those following the Cuban
revolution. For a discussion of the Cuban expropriations as a specific case study, see M.
GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE DEMIsE OF FOREIGN PRIVATE PROPERTY (1976).




same relationship between Aspirational Declarations and Public
Codes is present in nationalization regulation, where the former
are quite specific while the latter are more uncertain. Both are
clarified further by Operational Codes. In the joint venture area,
the clarification is a refinement of the use of the joint venture. But
for nationalization, it includes an entirely different form for resolv-
ing the issue.
The Operational Code for nationalizations calls for the resolu-
tion of the issue by way of lump-sum settlements. This major vari-
ance from a refinement of compensation provisions is the result of
several factors. The continued focus by multinational enterprises
and their home nation national governments on a supposed valid-
ity given by contemporary international law to the idea of prompt,
adequate and effective compensation creates an element to which
Operational Codes must respond. One element of the Operational
Code is its pragmatism. A host nation cannot enforce an Opera-
tional Code based on a restrictive Aspirational Declaration, either
paying no compensation or only a modest amount, and at the same
time expect a continued flow of foreign direct investment. The
lump-sum settlement, however, has not found its way into the
Public Codes for several reasons. In view of the exceptionally
strong mandates in the Aspirational Declarations, adopted by host
nation politicians as one of the non-negotiable elements of the
New International Economic Order, the main problem in this area
is that the public will not agree to revisions of the Public Code to
allow for lump-sum settlements. It is also understandable that the
area remains in significant conflict, because the effective law is lo-
cated solely in the Operational Code. That conflict may be reduced
in the future by a willingness to recognize that the Operational
Code has functioned well and has a large measure of consistency. It
is appropriate to develop new Public Codes, or preferably interna-
tional laws based on lump-sum settlements, which would end both
the conflict creating notions of the aspirations of sovereignty and
the remnants of the doctrine of prompt, adequate and effective
compensation.
The framework of the governance of multinationals presented
in this article is not limited to economic issues. It also can be used
to clarify activities of foreign direct investment which affect politi-
cal structures. A primary example involves the making of pay-
ments to foreign officials as part of trading activities of multina-




Aspirational Declarations broadly state that the activities of
multinationals should not intervene in the internal affairs of a host
state." But there has been little demand by host nations for a de-
tailed and restrictive declaration, which might reduce the effects of
fee payments to officials upon political institutions. The Economic
and Social Council of the United Nations has discussed the issue,
adopted resolutions, and recommended a conference to conclude
an international agreement on a list of payments. The discussion of
the issue has not received notable priority,"' nor have Public Codes
in host nations been directed to reduce the receipt of these pay-
ments or to establish legal structures which would assure fulfill-
ment of the laws enacted to stop the payments. The only major
response has been from the United States which adopted the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act in 1976 in order to eliminate the mak-
ing of improper payments to officials of other nations.2
The payments problem is an issue which involves more than
simply the enrichment of officials in developing nations. These
payments seriously interfere with the political systems in highly
industrialized nations as well as in the third world.9 It is doubtful
that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act would have been enacted
had the publicized payments been made only in developing na-
tions. Congress directed its concern primarily toward the
destabilization of United States political relationships with ad-
vanced nations.
The weakness of Aspirational Declarations and Public Codes
regarding corrupt payments, with the exception of the United
States, is clear. The rules regarding these payments remain where
90. See Charter of Economic Rights, supra note 37, at art. 2(b).
91. See Resolutions of the Economic and Social Council, on Corrupt Practices, Partic-
ularly Illicit Payments in International Commercial Transactions, Res. 2041 (LXI) and Res.
2122 (LXIII), reprinted in K. SIMMONDS, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS LAW, D.4-D.5
(1980).
92. See supra note 19.
93. Payments caused serious disruptions in the governments in Italy, Japan and the
Netherlands. The payment in the developing world which received the most publicity was
that by United Brands (formerly United Fruit) officials to high government officials (includ-
ing the president) in Honduras. Activities of United States banana producing companies in
Latin America have always generated considerable press attention, and that given to the
Honduran payment is as much attributable to the continuing saga of banana companies in
the derogatively labelled banana republics, as to the demise of a friendly government. See




they have existed for centuries, within the Operational Code. Gov-
ernments tend not to move matters from the Operational Code to
the Public Code when the matters deal with an issue of substantial
self-interest on the part of governing bodies. This is true even
where there is much public concern. In all but the most excep-
tional circumstances, enactments tend to be moral in tone and
minimal in teeth.
In the areas of nationalization and joint ventures, there is con-
siderable conflict between the developed and developing world as
to the goals to be achieved, while there is much less conflict over
payments to officials."' The Operational Code for payments to for-
eign officials creates problems for the participants. Unlike the
lump-sum settlement used to resolve nationalization disputes, an
agreed-upon payment to an official must remain secret. We thus
learn little about the Operational Code unless there is an unex-
pected disclosure. What appears to be occurring is the continued
functioning of an Operational Code mandating payments by mul-
tinationals. The United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has
been challenged, albeit carefully, because a multinational must ar-
gue for its repeal without admitting opposition to its moral ele-
ment. In essence, United States multinationals which make pay-
ments abroad must not only know of the Operational Code, but
participate in the preservation of the secrecy of that Code.
Host nations are not hesitant to incorporate into the Public
Code elements of an Operational Code which have been used by
multinational enterprises for their own benefit, even though pay-
ments to officials remain secret. The Public Code may reinforce
elements of the host nation's Operational Code only to be counter-
acted by multinationals through the development of an Opera-
tional Code which is not under the control of the host nation
authorities.
An example is the history of the use of the prestanombre, or
namelender, in Mexico. Before the 1973 Investment Law was en-
acted, foreign investors interested in a foreign direct investment in
94. There is little conflict regarding payments which may destabilize governments.
They are uniformly condemned. There are differences of opinion, however, often based on
cultural and social elements, as to what constitutes a conflict of interest by a government
official. Cultural differences create tension when a nation attempts to curtail payments
abroad by its enterprises through the extraterritorial reach of its laws. Those laws may at-
tempt to distinguish between unlawful payments, such as those to encourage officials to
disobey their laws, and those lawful (or less unlawful) payments, such as to expedite a nor-
mal process, i.e., the movement of goods through customs.
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Mexico were often required to accept a joint venture status under
the government's Operational Code. Many multinationals were un-
willing to relinquish fifty-one percent to Mexican owners, for fear
of loss of control. It was not uncommon to place fifty-one percent
of the enterprise in the hands of a Mexican, often the enterprise's
Mexican attorney. The Mexican attorney turned over the profits to
the enterprise and voted "his" shares according to the foreign en-
terprise's dictates." The Operational Code of the government was
satisfied; fifty-one percent of the company was owned locally. The
method, however, was not consistent with Mexican government
policies. Control remained abroad.
It therefore becomes evident that, according to a host nation,
there are acceptable and unacceptable ways to satisfy the dictates
of the Operational Code. The acceptable Operational Code would
have been to obtain an exception to the majority local ownership
requirements by offering a reason to the government, such as that
the company was transferring high technology to Mexico. The un-
acceptable action was resorting to the use of the prestanombre.
The 1973 Investment Law sought to correct this problem by pro-
viding for sanctions against individuals acting as a prestanombre.6
Thus, when a government considers the adoption of a new Public
Code, it may incorporate not only provisions supporting the poli-
cies which the government has been following in dealing with for-
eign direct investment through the functioning of the Operational
Code, but also provisions counteracting the development of
schemes by foreign investors. These schemes may be considered
elements of an Operational Code contrary to the interests of the
government.
A final example involves the cultural impact of foreign invest-
ment. Aspirational Declarations often reflect a concern over the
impact of foreign direct investment upon social and cultural insti-
tutions, but they tend to concentrate rather broadly on the issue.
They generally do not focus attention upon such specific economic
issues as the transfer of technology, joint ventures and acquisi-
tions. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States sug-
95. Several cases have occurred where the Mexican attorney sold his interest in the
enterprise, obviously much to the consternation of the foreign "parent." Because the Opera-
tional Code is secret, including the concept of the prestanombre, the government would
deny the existence of that institution, and refuse to provide any support in having the inter-
est returned to the multinational.
96. Mexican Investment Law, supra note 44, at art. 31.
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gests that a nation should be able to choose its "social and cultural
systems in accordance with the will of its people, without outside
interference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever. '97 Re-
peated provisions of the Charter illustrate a belief that social and
cultural institutions of a nation should not be harmed by the trad-
ing process."
Although host nations have not generally adopted Public
Codes to respond to disadvantageous impact on social and cultural
institutions by multinational enterprises, such damage has been
the subject of considerable writing.9 One reason for the scarcity of
legislation is that specific laws are not easily drafted. The impact
tends to be cumulative, through the aggregate presence of foreign
influences, extending beyond foreign direct investment to include
the impact caused by large numbers of tourists. There has been,
however, a response in the Operational Code.
Contrary to the typical lack of response to this problem, in
1976, Mexico passed the Mexican Inventions and Tradenames
Law, mandating that the use of trademarks of foreign origin to
protect articles manufactured in Mexico must be "in conjunction
with a mark originally registered in Mexico."10 The intention of
the law was clear: Mexico wished to establish a Mexican identity
with consumers for all products sold in Mexico. '1 This provision,
however, proved too aspirational for success as part of the Public
Code. Each year its application has been delayed by decrees. '
The delay might have been accomplished within the Operational
Code.
The process of using a formal delay, in contrast to the use of
the Operational Code, may illustrate that when the Public Code
includes provisions which appear too restrictive to enforce, but are
97. Charter of Economic Rights, supra note 37, at art. 1.
98. See supra note 75.
99. See, e.g., R. BARNETT & R. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH (1974); Gordon, The Impact of
the Multinational Corporation in the Third World, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS (ed. Simmonds 1977).
100. Mexican Inventions and Trademarks Law, at art. 127. This extensive law, con-
taining 237 articles, contains no other concepts that received such an immediate and nega-
tive reaction from multinational enterprises.
101. The legislative history identifies a specific Aspirational Declaration, the desire
that all products be known by Mexican names, not by foreign names or, as the law was
finally enacted, by joint names. There was some discussion about possible future amend-
ments which would require dropping the foreign name, leaving only the Mexican name.




popular, it is better not to allow an Operational Code concept of
non-enforcement to arise. Such an extensive variance would man-
date a closing of the gap between the Operational Code and the
Public Code. Furthermore, since it would be unpalatable to the
public to repeal such provisions, the deference in application was
accomplished by the formal Public Code delay.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Legal staffs of multinational enterprises are well aware that
Operational Codes exist. They are not only the practices of the de-
veloping and socialist nations, but are shared by developed nations
as well. An awareness of the existence of an Operational Code, and
what it is in a given country at a given time, are nevertheless quite
different matters. Multinational personnel must know with whom
to work if an investment is to be effective. Not every host nation
attorney who is adept at understanding the Operational Code has
access to all of the Code. Some attorneys can obtain otherwise se-
cret rulings of foreign investment commissions; others cannot and
must function as best they can with word-of-mouth knowledge of
the Operational Code.
The most successful multinational enterprises are those that
are aware of the various sources of law affecting foreign invest-
ment. This awareness, however, should not be misinterpreted as
constituting control by the multinational enterprise. A multina-
tional which appears to have a foreign investment with attributes
which differ from provisions of the Public Code, may simply have
"read" the Operational Code more effectively than others. The Op-
erational Code cloaks much activity of foreign direct investment. It
can lead to increased criticism from the public sector, particularly
the press and academia, which may identify practices of multina-
tionals that appear to the public to be at variance with the Public
Code. The multinationals, however, have not necessarily violated
the law, they have followed the Operational Code completely in
accordance with the practices of the host nation government.
Many officials of developing nations question why their nation
is not the recipient of increasing amounts of foreign direct invest-
ment. Yet, they often fail to realize that functioning within an
often complex matrix of regulations is a costly process to a foreign
investor. Medium and smaller firms that are not immediately
turned away by a restrictive Public Code, may decline an invest-
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ment later in time when they are either unable to comprehend, or
unwilling to assume the cost of access to, the Operational Code.
The existence of an Operational Code may have benefits for the
developing nation, but clearly it has its detriments in discouraging
much needed investment.
Operational Codes are unlikely to fade from the control
scheme of foreign investments. No serious movement has been
made towards a unification of foreign investment laws among the
developing nations. Such a process would be extremely difficult,
considering the diversity of levels of development and resources
among the advanced developing and dependent countries, and the
ability to harmonize those interests with those of socialist nations.
Multinationals may expect continued confrontation with a
framework of regulations which vary widely from nation-to-nation.
But an understanding of the Operational Code, and how Aspira-
tional Declarations may affect the function of the Operational
Code, should provide a greater understanding and afford a better
degree of predictability to multinationals functioning in developing
and socialist host nations. This conceptual framework illustrates
that the maze of regulatory patterns is understandable and can be
penetrated to the benefit of foreign investors and the development
of host nations.
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